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A study of teachers' opinions of alternative compensation plans

Wilkin, Donna Kay, Ph.D.
Iowa State University, 1988

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A study of teachers' opinions of alternative compensation plans

by

Donna Kay Wilkin

A Dissertation Submitted to the

Graduate Faculty in Partial Fulfillment of the

Requirements for the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department: Professional Studies in Education
Major: Education (Educational Administration)

Approved:

Signature was redacted for privacy.

In Charge of Major Work

Signature was redacted for privacy.

For the Major Department

Signature was redacted for privacy.

Fór the Graduate College

Iowa State University Ames, Iowa

1988

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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

The nationwide emphasis on teacher accountability and excellence has spurred school districts throughout the country to implement various types of alternative compensation programs for teachers. In their broadest sense, alternative compensation plans provide incentives for the recruitment, professional development, and retention of highly qualified teachers (District of Columbia Public Schools, 1984). Merit pay, monetary and nonmonetary incentives, and career ladders, are examples of performance-based plans which compensate teachers differently according to the quality of their work; supplemental pay plans compensate teachers for extra work outside school hours (Flannelly & Palaich, 1985). By 1985, twenty-six states had either established state wide alternative compensation plans or had passed legislation allowing districts to develop their own plans (Bray et al., 1985).

In 1987 the Iowa legislature appropriated approximately fifty million dollars for performance-based and supplemental pay to teachers for the 1987-88 school year (Iowa General Assembly House File 499, 1987). Under this legislation, each district which submitted a plan that was approved by the state Department of Education

received \$82.66 per pupil to enact its plan. For the 1987-88 school year, 428 districts out of 436 total districts received state approval for their plans. Arrowhead Area Education Agency (AEA) 5 in Fort Dodge, Iowa, assisted the 45 school districts which it serves in developing their Phase III plans. (A description of the services and activities provided by this Phase III Program will be described in Chapter III.) The teachers in these 45 school districts were the subjects of this study. Their responses to two surveys (one prior to the Phase III activities and one following those activities) provided the data for this research.

Despite the national proclivity to adopt alternative compensation plans, critics caution that the average longevity of such programs is less than five years (Porwoll, 1979). Recent studies suggest that two of the factors contributing to the failure of alternative compensation plans are (a) the lack of teacher involvement in the development of the plan (Murnane & Cohen (1985), Ogletree (1985), and Boyles & Vrochta, (1986) and (b) a poor match between the type of plan adopted and the types of teachers in the district (Ogletree, 1985).

However, little research has been conducted to determine teacher preference for alternative compensation

plans and the reward and evaluation components of those plans. Additionally, few studies have investigated whether teachers with certain characteristics prefer different types of alternative compensation plans than teachers with other characteristics. And no evidence is apparent which indicates whether teachers who participate in the development of their district's plan (which involves attending workshops addressing the research on alternative compensation plans) subsequently view alternative compensation programs differently than teachers who are not directly involved in the development of their district's plan. Such information could be utilized by districts to design plans with the potential to remain in effect longer than five years.

Statement of the Problem

This study addressed the problem of the lack of information regarding teacher preference for alternative compensation plans. The issue is both current and critical, for there is a need to know what teachers think about pay based upon performance. Specifically, the researcher asked the following questions in the study.

1. What are teachers' opinions of the reward components of alternative compensation plans?

- What are teachers' opinions of evaluation components of alternative compensation plans?
- 3. What are teachers' opinions of alternative compensation plans?
- 4. Do teachers with certain characteristics prefer different types of plans than teachers with other characteristics?
- 5. Do teachers who participate in the development of a district plan change their ratings of alternative compensation plans after their participation in the development of the plan?
- 6. Do teachers who do not participate in the development of a district plan change their ratings of alternative compensation plans after their district's plan has been developed?

Purposes of the Study

There were three primary purposes of the study. The first purpose was to determine teachers' opinions of alternative compensation plans including: (a) reward components, (b) evaluation components, and (c) overall type of plan adopted. The second purpose was to

determine whether teachers with certain characteristics prefer different types of plans than teachers with other characteristics. The third purpose of the study was to determine whether teachers' opinions of alternative compensation plans change after the development of their districts' plans.

Objectives of the Study

The specific objectives of the study are stated below. Objectives one through four refer to data collected prior to districts initiating activities to develop alternative compensation plans. Objectives five and six refer to data collected both before and after districts initiated activities to develop alternative compensation plans.

- To determine teachers' ratings of the reward components of alternative compensation plans
- To determine teachers' ratings of the evaluation components of alternative compensation plans
- 3. To determine teachers' ratings of six alternative compensation plans: including "Merit Pay With Salary Schedule", "Merit Pay Without Salary Schedule", "Monetary Incentives", "Nonmonetary

Incentives", "Career Ladders", and "Supplemental
Pay"

- 4. To determine whether teachers with certain characteristics differ in their ratings of types of alternative compensation plans from teachers with other characteristics. The teacher characteristics studied include:
 - a. years teaching experience
 - b. involvement in professional development
 - c. employment outside the school district
 - d. attitude toward changes in the school setting
 - e. perception of self as a teacher
 - f. gender
 - g. grade level taught
 - h. the interaction of gender and grade level taught

This objective will be addressed in Hypotheses #1 - 8.

5. To determine whether teachers who participate in the development of their districts' alternative compensation plans (which includes attending workshops addressing the research regarding alternative compensation plans) change their ratings of alternative compensation plans after

- participating in the development of the plan.

 This objective will be addressed in Hypothesis #9
- 6. To determine whether teachers who do not participate in the development of a district's alternative compensation plan change their ratings of alternative compensation plans after their district plans have been developed. This objective will be addressed in Hypothesis #10

Research Hypotheses

This study examined teachers' opinions of alternative compensation plans before and after districts initiated activities to develop alternative compensation plans.

(Those activities will be explained in Chapter III.) The six types of alternative compensation plans studied included: "Merit Pay With Salary Schedule", "Merit Pay Without Salary Schedule", "Monetary Incentives", "Nonmonetary Incentives", "Career Ladders", and "Supplemental Pay".

HO1: Prior to the development of a district's alternative compensation plan, there is no significant difference in mean teacher ratings of each alternative compensation plan (the rating portion of items 43 - 48 on the survey)

for the following categories of teachers: (a)
teachers with 0-3 years teaching experience, (b)
teachers with 4-11 years teaching experience,
(c) teachers with 12 -19 years experience, and
teachers with 20 or more years experience (item
7 on the survey)

- HO2: Prior to the development of a district's alternative compensation plan, there is no significant difference in mean teacher ratings of each alternative compensation plan (the rating portion of items 43 48 on the survey) the following categories of teachers: (a) teachers who participate in 0-1 professional courses or workshops per year, and (b) teachers who participate in 2 or more professional courses or workshops per year (item 8 on the survey)
- HO3: Prior to the development of a district's alternative compensation plan, there is no significant difference in mean teacher ratings of each alternative compensation plan (the rating portion of items 43 48 on the survey) the following categories of teachers: (a)

teachers who are not employed outside the school district, (b) teachers who work outside the school district for enjoyment or to earn money for extras, and (c) teachers who work outside the school district in order to earn money for necessities (item 9 on the survey)

HO4: Prior to the development of a district's alternative compensation plan, there is no significant difference in mean teacher ratings of each alternative compensation plan (the rating portion of items 43 - 48 on the survey) for the following categories of the variable "Attitude Toward Change in the Work Setting":

(a) teachers who describe themselves as "Enthusiastic" or "Interested" in changes in their work setting, and (b) teachers who describe themselves as "Neutral", "Concerned", or "Very Concerned" about changes in their work setting (item 11 on the survey)

HO5: Prior to the development of a district's alternative compensation plan, there is no significant difference in mean teacher ratings of each alternative compensation plan (the rating portion of items 43 - 48 on the survey)

for the following categories of teachers: (a)
teachers who perceive themselves as
"Exceptional", (b) teachers who perceive
themselves as "Above Average", and (c) teachers
who perceive themselves as "Average" or "Below
Average" (item 12 on the survey)

- HO6: Prior to the development of a district's alternative compensation plan, male and female teachers (item 5 on the survey) do not differ significantly in their ratings of each alternative compensation plan (the rating portion of items 43-48 on the survey)
- HO7: Prior to the development of a district's alternative compensation plan, teachers' ratings of each alternative compensation plan (the rating portion of items 43-48 on the survey) do not differ according to the grade level at which they teach (item 6 on the survey)
- HO8: Prior to the development of a district's alternative compensation plan, there is no interaction effect between gender and grade level taught when examining teacher ratings of

each alternative compensation plan (the rating portion of items 43 - 48 on the survey)

HO9: Teachers who participate in the development of their district's alternative compensation plan (item 4 on the survey) indicate no significant changes in their ratings of each alternative compensation plan (the rating portion of items 43 - 48 on the survey) before and after their participation in the development of the plans

HO10: Teachers who do not participate in the development of their district's alternative compensation plan (item 4 on the survey) indicate no significant changes in their ratings of each alternative compensation plan (the rating portion of items 43 - 48 on the survey) before and after their participation in the development of the plan

Definition of Terms

The terminology used to describe alternative activities to develop alternative compensation plans is frequently confusing and conflicting. A term used by one district to describe a certain type of plan may be used by another district to describe a very different type of

plan. Therefore, the following definitions are provided (Tyler, Texas Independent School District, 1984).

Alternative Compensation - Payment for teachers which may include but is not solely based on the salary schedule Career Ladders - Programs which establish several levels of career advancement for teachers (e.g., master teacher, apprentice, etc.) that tie each level to a higher salary, additional competencies and different combinations of responsibilities

Merit Pay - Payment for teachers based on either input criteria such as classroom performance, knowledge of subject matter, etc. or on outcomes of a teacher's efforts such as student test scores

Monetary Incentives - Financial compensation for teachers who meet certain established goals or objectives such as reducing absenteeism, acquiring new skills, or accepting difficult teaching assignments

Nonmonetary Incentives - Opportunities for professional improvement and activities as well as recognition and non-financial compensation for teachers who meet certain performance standards or objectives

<u>Performance-based Compensation</u> - Payment for teachers which is based either wholly or partly on work quality <u>Supplemental Pay</u> - Additional payment to teachers for work after contract hours (e.g., curriculum development, staff training, coaching, etc.)

Assumptions

It was assumed that the Arrowhead AEA 5 Phase III Survey provided a valid appraisal of teacher characteristics and teacher preferences for alternative activities to develop. It was further assumed that the participating teachers gave candid responses to all questions on the survey.

Delimitations

The following factors limited the scope of the investigation:

- The study was limited to public school teachers from forty-five school districts in Arrowhead Area Education Agency (AEA) 5 in north central Iowa
- 2. Teacher characteristics were determined by teacher's responses to multiple choice questions about themselves

- 3. The teacher characteristic "Attitude Towards Change" was determined by teachers' answers to only one question about this characteristic
- 4. Teachers identified as not participating in the development of an alternative compensation plan may have been indirectly involved in the development of their district's plan

CHAPTER II: REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Introduction

American education during the 1980s has been confronted with fervent and conflicting demands from the public. Citizens concerned about declining educational standards have called for a more demanding curriculum and better teachers. At the same time Americans worried about a sagging economy have demanded more fiscal efficiency from school districts and educational institutions. Simply put, American education has been challenged to do better and to cost less. In response to these political pressures, many states and local school districts have proposed new systems for compensating teachers. These new systems generally have incorporated the concept of paying teachers according to their performance -- a concept which has gained political support at the highest state and national levels (Kapel, et al., 1985). Witness the support for merit pay by Former Secretary of Education Bell (1963), the House Committee on Education and Labor (1983), and President Reagan (Washington, Post, 1983).

The National Commission on Excellence in Education (1983), recommended that:

Salaries for the teaching profession should be increased and should be professionally competitive, market sensitive, and performance-based. Salary, promotion, tenure, and retention decisions should be tied to an effective evaluation system that includes peer review so that superior teachers can be rewarded, average ones encouraged, and poor ones either improved or terminated. School boards, administrators, and teachers should cooperate to develop career ladders for teachers that distinguish among the beginning instructor, the experienced teacher, and the master teacher. Master teachers should be involved in designing teacher preparation programs and in supervising teachers during the probationary years.

Yet, despite the burgeoning support from officials, many educators regard merit reform as more "cosmetic than cosmic" (Seib, 1984). Addressing the merit pay recommendations of the National Commission on Excellence, a vocational eduation teacher from Michigan wrote, "To think that merit pay would come close to solving any of the problems in education today is to think that a Band-Aid will cure heart disease" (Adkins, 1983). Perhaps more than any other area of educational reform, performance-based pay has created fervent supporters and detractors who find almost no common area of agreement in the controversy.

A review of the current literature regarding alternative compensation plans reveals three major areas of research critical to the development of this study:

(a) research involving the types of alternative

compensation plans used by school districts, (b) research involving opinions of alternative compensation systems, and (c) research investigating teacher characteristics and/or the relationship of teacher characteristics to preference for alternative compensation plans. Each of these three areas will be addressed separately in this chapter.

Research on Types of Alternative Compensation Plans
In 1985 more than 99 percent of American public
school teachers were employed in districts that utilized
uniform salary scales. Under such contracts, a teacher's
salary is determined exclusively by educational
credentials and years teaching experience (Murnane &
Cohen, 1985). However, by 1986 more than 300 state and
local commissions had emphasized the need for changes in
the structure of the teaching profession including
providing more incentives for attracting and retaining
talented persons in the profession (Duttweiler &
Ramos-Cancel, 1986), and more than twenty states had
placed some form of incentive-pay proposal on their
legislative agendas (Education USA, 1986).

Merit pay, monetary incentives, nonmonetary incentives, and career ladders are the most prevalant types of performance-based alternative compensation

systems. Supplemental pay is generally not considered a performance-based system (Tyler, Texas Independent School District, 1984). Unfortunately, these terms are often used ambiguously and interchangeably even though the models differ significantly in their basic concepts.

In a study of 76 performance-based compensation plans in the United States, Boyles and Vrchota (1986) identified nine "success elements" which must be addressed before any success with a plan might be expected:

- 1. Planning both long term and on-going
- Organization identifying the type of plan utilized
- Participation mandatory vs. non-mandatory and .
 individual vs. group
- Evaluators administrators, peers, a committee, others
- Evaluation Process number of observations and conferences, criteria, self-evaluation
- 6. Incentive Plans: Financial stipends, awards, advancement on salary schedule, extra pay for extra work, annual or permanent salary adjustments, amount paid
- 7. Incentive Plans: Nonfinancial type of compensation, purpose, amount of money expended

- 8. Financial Resources amount available, sources of funds
- 9. Plan Monitoring/Revisions purpose, frequency, participants

In summary, Boyles and Vrchota concluded that:

There are many school districts applying the principles of performance-based compensation plans. Most of these plans are very new and some will or have failed. But many have and will continue to succeed.

Murnane and Cohen (1985) were not as optomistic in their view of merit pay as Boyles and Vrchota. In their conclusion of research involving six school districts using merit pay plans, Cohen and Murnane (1985) write that:

The very attributes of design and community that make merit pay successful in the short run tend to make it self-defeating in the long run. This does not mean that some forms of merit pay are not useful under some circumstances. It just means that merit pay is not by itself an enduring or an entirely satisfactory way to strengthen incentives for good teaching.

Merit Pay Plans

Merit pay plans generally involve performance-based salary increments or bonuses which are annually determined on the basis of teacher evaluation (Bacarach et al., 1984). The basic concept underlying most

merit-pay proposals is that teachers can be motivated to perform more effectively if some form of monetary reward is available for outstanding performance (Darling-Hammond, 1985). Such plans have a long and erratic history in American schools. A survey of 3,000 school districts by the Educational Research Service (1979) found that 4 percent of the respondents were using some kind of merit pay plan while 8 percent had once tried merit pay but had abandoned it. The major reason for the failure of these plans was that schools found it difficult to devise defensible criteria for meritorious teaching (Cohen & Murnane, 1985).

Other researchers (Duttweiler & Ramos-Cancel, 1986; Robinson, 1983) have found that the places where merit pay has survived for many years are typically small, fairly wealthy school districts to which the following conditions pertain:

- 1. Most teachers receive merit pay awards each year, although the amounts may vary. There are no quotas on the number of teachers eligible.
- 2. Base teachers' salaries are already professionally competitive; funding for basic salaries, improved evaluation, and merit pay awards are consistent and plentiful.

3. Performance evaluation is a small part of the overall determination; many other criteria are used.

These often include teacher initiatives in developing projects that contribute to the overall school program as well as group initiatives.

- 4. Award determinations are based on a carefully designed, comprehensive process that uses multiple sources of input and, often, multiple evaluators.

 Evaluators are well-trained, and substantial time is spent on evaluation. An appeals process is included.
- 5. Teachers are heavily involved in both the design and implementation of the merit pay system.

Most experts agree that unless these conditions can be achieved, merit pay plans are more likely to be counterproductive than helpful to retention and morale (Duttweiler & Ramos-Cancel, 1986).

Koeler (1985) found that the competition inherent in merit pay plans may interfere with the collegiality that is necessary within an effective school. Similarly, a study by Cramer (1983) concluded that, "Only disaster can result from the practice of using money to punish some teachers while giving 'merit' money to a handful of other teachers selected as superior". And Cohen and Murnane (1985) determined that merit pay did not appear to have

strong effects on improving teachers' classroom performance.

Monetary Incentives

Monetary incentives provide financial bonuses to teachers for meeting a district's personnel assignment, objectives or other goals (Flannelly & Palaich, 1985). The basic concept underlying monetary incentives is that teachers will more effectively help the district or school meet certain goals or solve certain problems if they receive additional payment to do so (Guernsey, 1986).

The best known plan of this type is the Houston Second Mile Plan which awards grants from \$150 to \$2,000 to teachers who further their professional development, have good attendance records, teach in high priority locations, and teach in subject areas for which there are insufficient numbers of teachers. This plan is not based on the individual evaluation of teachers (Miller & Say, 1982). Hatry and Greiner (1982) reported an improvement in Houston teachers' attendance and turnover and decreases in teacher vacancies two years into the plan. However, there was no effect on student achievement. Palaich and Flannelly (1984) suggest that monetary

incentives are not an effective way to permanently change the way most teachers perform in the classsroom.

Merit incentives must also be regarded by teachers to be worth their efforts (Boyles & Vrchota, 1986). It has been suggested that incentive amounts range from five to 20 percent above base salary or at least \$1,000 to be considered sufficient (Hatry & Gruner, 1982). The incentives may be linked to the regular salary schedule, or the pay may be administered in a separate salary schedule (McQuire, C.K., 1984).

Nonmonetary Incentives

Nonmonetary compensation is generally for professional enrichment, or for enrichment in the classroom (Boyles & Vrchota, 1986). The concept behind most nonmonetary plans is that teachers are motivated by opportunities to develop professionally and to expand their responsibilities and autonomy (Ogletree, 1985). Nonmonetary rewards such as opportunities for personal and professional growth, better working conditions, increased recognition, and opportunities to work on challenging projects with colleagues may result in the most significant improvements in teaching performance (Dunwell, 1986). A report available through the ERIC Clearinghouse (1981) concludes that teachers are less

motivated by money than by the various intrinsic rewards available to them in the classroom; therefore, schools should adopt merit "praise" programs. Hatry and Gruner (1982) suggest that a "menu of awards" besides cash should be offered. They believe that nonmonetary programs can stimulate improved performance while providing incentives at a low cost to the district. The Catalina Foothills (Arizona) program utilizes Herzberg's Hygiene Motivation Theory as the basis for its program because nonmonetary compensation is viewed as an alternative to monetary compensation in providing opportunities for growth, achievement, advancement, and recognition (Frase, Hetzel, & Grant, 1982).

Career Ladders

The research is generally supportive of career ladder systems. The concept behind most career ladder proposals is that compensation and career structures should be re-designed so they provide incentives for professional development much like those of other professional occupations (Darling-Hammond, 1985). Studies have found that career ladder programs have improved the quality of instruction by separating teacher tasks and allowing for increased specialization (English, 1972), and that students have benefited from such programs because the

restructuring of teacher responsibilities has increased the potential for individual instruction (Ogletree & Kuzminsi, 1985).

Barro (1985) described four principal differences between career ladder plans and merit pay and incentive plans.

- 1. A career ladder plan offers a type of professional recognition not offered by merit pay or incentive plans. Promotion to each successively higher rank is considered an honor and presumably is advertised as such.
- 2. The special, non-teaching responsibilities associated with the higher ranks of a career ladder are likely to affect teachers' incentives to attain those ranks, but it cannot be assumed that the effect would be positive for all teachers.
- 3. Rewards under career ladder plans are likely to be permanent, but long waits may be required to become eligible for each successive promotion. The rewards under merit pay and incentive plans may be either permanent or temporary but, in either case, are likely to be accessible with less delay. These timing differences may affect the strength of the incentives considerably.
- 4. Under pure merit pay plans and most incentive plans, high-performing teachers remain in the classroom.

In contrast, under "true" career ladders, the best performers - "master" or "mentor" teachers - spend significantly more time in non-teaching roles. Although there is likely to be less of a short-term gain in classroom performance, the mentor/master role constitutes investment in the future -- time spent evaluating other teachers and helping them to improve.

In 1984, as a result of state legislation and appropriations, 48 school districts in Utah submitted career ladder plans to the State Office of Education (Murphy, 1984). The plans varied considerably from district to district; however, the following three characteristics were found in the majority of plans:

- The career ladders consisted of either three or four steps (or promotion levels).
- The promotions resulted in increased responsibility of work (job enlargement).
- 3. Non-competitive promotion was utilized for the first promotion on the ladder (i.e., all who met the standard were promoted). Competitive promotion was used for promotion to higher levels (i.e., the best qualified were promoted).

Other states including Tennessee, Florida, and California and numerous local districts including

Charlotte-Mecklenberg, North Carolina and Virginia Beach, Virginia have also implemented career ladder programs (Guernsey, 1986). One researcher concluded his study of career ladders with the following summary:

Career ladders have the potential to provide teachers intrinsic rewards in the form of recognition and status for excellent teachers; options for diverse work responsibilities without leaving the classroom entirely; opportunities for career addvancement; career options within teaching and control over these options; opportunities to assist beginning teachers; greater collegial interaction with peers; the chance to use a wider spectrum of abilities; and opportunities for professional growth (Burden, 1985).

Supplemental Pay

Supplemental pay is the most commonly used form of alternative compensation. Also known as extra pay for extra duty, it may be earned for either supervisory duties (i.e., coaching teams, sponsoring clubs, chairing committees, etc.) or instructional duties (i.e., writing curriculum, developing materials, etc.) (Tyler, Texas Independent School District, 1984). Teachers may earn the money for working outside school hours during the school year or for working during the summer months. Districts vary in the rate of supplemental pay which is earned by teachers. Some districts base the pay on the teachers' regular rates of pay and others base it on the nature of the extra work (McQuire, 1984). Supplemental

pay is not considered a form of performance-based pay unless the pay is based on a teacher's performance of those extra duties.

Teachers' Opinions of Alternative Compensation Plans
Research regarding teachers' opinions of alternative
compensation plans is scarce and inconclusive. The few
studies which have been conducted generally have
addressed only "merit pay", using the term generically to
refer to all types of performance-based pay plans.
Additionally, each study has utilized a different set of
criteria for evaluation of the plans. Therefore, melding
the data from the various studies into a comprehensive
picture of teachers' opinions can be accomplished only by
permitting a certain amount of ambiguity within the
conclusions. This section will address the results of
studies regarding teachers' opinions of three areas: (a)
general types of alternative compensation plans, (b)
reward components, and (c) evaluation components.

Opinions of General Types of Plans

In 1982, Phi Delta Kappa conducted a survey of teachers regarding teacher pay. Merit pay was opposed by a 2-1 ratio, 64 percent to 32 percent (Gallup, 1984). A previous poll conducted by NEA in 1971 had shown a similar finding (Calhoun & Protheroe, 1983). These

findings, however, contradict those of Rist (1983) who reported a "clear majority (63%) of teachers responding to a national poll agreed that teachers should be paid according to how well they perform in the classroom." In a 1985 study of Illinois teachers' opinions of compensation plans, Ogletree found that the majority of teachers (50%) opposed merit pay with 58 percent believing it would not enhance morale. On the subject of different types of merit pay plans, the majority (80%) rejected multiple salary schedules and varied salary increments and 50 percent rejected accelerated movement up the pay scale.

Historically both the American Federation of Teachers (AFT) and the National Education Association (NEA) have opposed any form of merit or incentive pay for teachers. Recently, however, both unions have found the merit pay issue more acceptable (Lee, 1987). Research indicates that when teacher organizations and school management cooperate in implementing a merit pay plan for teachers, the results can be positive (Calhoun & Protheroe, 1983).

In a study of Mississippi teachers' opinions of merit pay (Lee, 1987) found that 47.9 percent of teachers favored merit pay although only 8 percent agreed that the total salary increase for teachers should be based on merit. The two primary reasons stated for teacher

opposition to merit pay are: (a) the difficulty of evaluating teacher performance, and (b) the morale problems which might arise (Lee, 1987).

Opinions of Reward Components

Few studies have addressed the issue of teachers' opinions of reward components. However, in a study of teacher incentives and rewards, Mitchell (1983) makes the following conclusions regarding teachers' opinions of rewards and incentives:

- Appropriate motivation plays a vital role in determining the quality of teacher work efforts.
- Rewards, broadly conceived, are the most effective work motivators;
- 3. Policies that give primary attention to strengthening organization-level, purposive incentives have the greatest chance of improving teacher work performance.
- 4. Policies that facilitate the development of appropriate group-level, solidarity incentives will also significantly improve teacher work performance.
- 5. Among the individual-level incentives available to teachers, the predominant role is played by those which rely on <u>intrinsic</u> rewards.

6. While extrinsic rewards (like salary and comfortable working conditions) play a significant role in motivating teachers -- especially in their recruitment and retention-- they cannot be expected to produce intense engagement or high performance.

Cohen and Murnane (1985) found that teachers' opinions of merit pay change as the circumstances in which they operate change. Non-tenured teachers are more receptive to merit rewards than tenured teachers. And teachers in districts with a high proportion of good teachers prefer reward components which are finely graded and small in amount.

In Ogletree's study of teachers' opinions of merit pay plans, he concludes that, "Employees are more highly motivated where organizational expectation of rewards are tied to the achievement of specific goals and are open to as many employees as can attain the objective", and that, "Money spent on school reform might best be used to improve working conditions in the schools, smaller class sizes, safety and discipline, counseling services, parent participation, materials and books, tutorial services, smaller schools, etc., than providing minute bonuses to a limited few."

Opinions of Evaluation Components

In his survey of teachers' opinions of merit pay plans, Ogletree (1985) found that 75 percent of the teachers felt that teaching could not be objectively measured, and 67 percent did not feel merit pay could be awarded objectively. Additionally, 63 percent believed the criteria for evaluation could be political and 59 percent believed it could foster favoritism. Sixty-seven percent of the teachers rejected periodic performance on the National Teacher Examination or comparable examinations as a basis of merit pay. And teachers were adamantly against student performance as an evaluation criterion (80%).

In the area of instruction, 71 percent favored knowledge of subject area as a basis for evaluation and 45 percent favored positive relationships with students. While in the non-instructional domain only 45 percent supported professional growth and only 29 percent favored colleague relations as a criteria.

The teachers also did not support many other evaluation criteria. Only 30 percent favored attendance as a criterion, 50 percent favored teaching difficult to educate students and 33 percent supported teaching in areas where a teacher shortage exists.

On the question of who should evaluate teachers for the purpose of merit pay, 67 percent accepted a combination of administrator, colleague, and parent evaluation. And the majority (65%) said teachers should be evaluated once or twice a year with 83 percent receptive to merit pay as long as "teachers helped develop the rating and evaluative criteria".

Lee (1987) found that teachers believe there is no consistent, reliable, valid method of evaluating teacher performance, and Carl J. Megel of the American Federation of Teachers has stated that the true effectiveness of teachers cannot be fairly rated (Calhoun & Protheroe, 1983). However, Albert Shanker also of the American Federation of Teachers stated that the AFT would be willing to accept a merit pay plan "if evaluations were made by somebody that teachers had confidence in" (Shanker, 1985).

Forty-eight percent of Mississippi teachers preferred a statewide evaluation system designed by the State Department of Education while 32 percent of the teachers perferred to have local districts design their own systems. Forty-seven percent of the Mississippi teachers believed that peer evaluation should be a part of the evaluation process, 24 percent believed that student achievement should be a factor, 15 percent agreed that

teachers should take a test on subject matter to qualify for merit pay, and 67 percent agreed that teachers 60 years of age or older should meet the same evaluation criteria as other teachers.

In a study of the Virginia Beach, Virginia Career Service Plan, Cohen and Murnane (1985) found that the low rate of teacher participation in the program was due in part to teachers' negative opinions regarding the evaluation methods and criteria. In that district the merit pay decisions were made by a central office personnel administrator, and the evaluation criteria were not related to classroom work.

In another study of the Niskayuna, New York school district, Cohen and Murnane found that administrators had difficulties in making distinctions between outstanding teachers and those who were merely quite good. One administrator in the study told of rating a teacher as "outstanding" (the next to the top rating), rather than "exceptional" (the top rating). The teacher walked away and said, "If that's all you care, that's all you get." The researchers' concluded that merit pay plans in good districts seem to defeat themselves over time because the more uniformly good a teaching staff is, the more difficult it is to evaluate quality distinctions.

Additionally they found that honest merit ratings may create disincentives for teachers' improvement, and dishonest ratings may be more likely to produce positive results because inflated ratings are a defense against teacher discouragement and jealousy.

Research on Teacher Characteristics

The following two sections address the research on teacher characteristics. The first section reviews the literature regarding the relationship between teacher characteristics and opinions of alternative compensation plans. The second section addresses the general research on teacher characteristics.

Teacher Characteristics and Opinions of Merit Pay

Few studies have investigated whether preference for alternative compensation plans is dependent on certain teacher characteristics. However, the relationship between the grade level at which educators teach and their opinions of merit pay was examined in Lee's (1987) study of Mississippi teachers. Lee surveyed elementary (k - 6) and secondary (7 - 12) teachers regarding a variety of issues involving merit pay. His results revealed that 6 percent of elementary teachers agreed that the total salary schedule should be based on merit while 10 percent of the secondary teachers agreed with

the statement. Forty-four percent of the elementary teachers felt that a percentage of the total teacher pay raise should be made across the board and the rest should go for merit pay while 47 percent of the secondary teachers felt similarly.

Lee also determined that 44 percent of the elementary teachers agreed that peer evaluation should be a part of the process while 52 percent of the secondary teachers agreed with that premise. Elementary and secondary teachers did not differ in their opinions of the use of student achievement as a criterion for evaluation (24%); however, they did disagree on whether or not a competency test should be required to qualify for merit pay — elementary (12%) and secondary (20%).

General Research on Teacher Characteristics

Although the literature contains minimal information regarding the relationship between teacher characteristics and opinions of alternative compensation plans, there is substantial research which addresses the relationship between teachers' characteristics and their opinions on a variety of other issues. Following is a brief review of the research on six teacher characteristics.

Gender

Teacher gender has long been a topic of educational research. However, the findings have changed dramatically during the last twenty years. As late as the 1960s and 1970s the research reported that women were less committed to their work than men (Hall, 1966), that they did not view teaching as a career (Mason, Dressel, and Bain, 1959), and that they deferred to men at work (Simpson and Simpson, 1969).

The new scholarship on women is undertaken from an opposite perspective. It suggests that the previous research on female teachers was misleading because it was based on stereotyped assumptions about women (Biklin and Shakeshaft, 1985). Several studies have determined that women and men are highly similar in their motivations and involvement with their jobs, in their job satisfaction, and in their perceived conflict between the demands of work and home (Grandjean and Bernal, 1979; Marrett, 1972; and Miller, 1979). Miller (1980) found that the actual job conditions, rather than gender, have the greatest effect on worker satisfaction. One gender difference, however, was described by Miller as "dramatic":

It seems to be the autonomy associated with complex work that produces job satisfaction for men. For women, complex work does not

necessarily imply autonomy; their subjective rewards come from the challenge and interest inherent in the tasks themselves, not freedom from control.

Years Teaching Experience

In a study of teachers' perceptions of their personal and professional development, Burden (1985) found that teachers describe different characteristics during identifiable periods in their careers. Developmental changes seem to occur in an ordered, hierarchical sequence with each year characterized by different types of changes. The changes occur gradually and are cumulative. At each stage there seems to be an increase of knowledge, leading to a change in attitude, which increases ability, and subsequently changes job performance. Other researchers have found similar developmental changes in teacher attitude and performance during the course of their careers (Fuller & Brown, 1975; Newman, 1979; Peterson; 1979).

Professional Development

Burden (1985) found that the major influences on teacher development were (a) other teachers and (b) contact with children. However, he also found that teachers who participate in staff development or other professional workshops or courses indicate they benefit from those courses.

Lanier and Little (1986) described continuing education for teachers as "mediocre" and the prospects for change as "discouraging". Schlechty and Crowell (1983) found professional development programs to be programmatically isolated and politically weak. And McLaughlin and Marsh (1979) argue that staff development has grown in importance but not quality.

Cusick (1983) contends that involvement with professional development must compete with a host of other interests and obligations and that staff development takes second or third place behind other obligations. Christensen, Burke, Fessler, and Hagstrom (1983) found that little premium is placed in professional improvement in a career that offers few rewards and opportunities based on evolving skill, sophistication, and professional standing.

Employment Outside School District

The National Education Association (1980) reported that about half of all teachers work at other jobs (moonlight) to supplement their teaching salaries.

However, Rosenfeld (1979) found that only 20 percent of all teachers hold second jobs. Lortie (1975) determined

that due to "front-loaded" salary scales, i.e., where there is no major change from beginning to experienced teacher salaries, many teachers must supplement their salaries to enhance their standard of living.

In a study involving Oklahoma teachers, Wisniewski and Kleine (1983) found that 31 percent held jobs outside the school system. Forty-eight percent of the male teachers in the state indicated they worked outside the school district and 23 percent of the females indicated likewise. They estimated their annual earnings at these jobs as approximately \$5,136.

The teachers' primary reasons for moonlighting were:

(a) to pay debts (37%) and (b) to enhance the family
standard of living (36%). The majority (58%) of teachers
in the study did not feel that their supplemental
employment hindered their teaching performance; however,
59 percent indicated that it did interfere with their
participation in professisonal development workshops and
courses. Wisniewski also concluded that the types of
jobs taken are not generally conducive to high
professional status, and that "teachers will engage in
almost any employment that will supplement their income
regardless of the social status involved".

Attitude Toward Change

Recent literature suggests that an examination of teachers' attitudes toward change cannot be adequately conducted without focusing on the context in which that change occurs. Runkel et al. (1980) writes that the response of teachers to change cannot be anticipated or understood without attention to the institutional factors that help determine the work-role behavior of teachers. Giacquinta (1975) suggests that variations in receptivity to change are associated with perceived risks to status—the higher one perceives the risks (and the lower the benefits) the lower his or her receptivity. Bridges (1968) developed a scale refelecting varying circumstances associated with change: degree of uncertainty, energy requirements, and amount of role change.

Wangen (1982) determined that teachers with high receptivity to change had the following characteristics: they were older, more experienced, and less mobile than other teachers; they were rated by other educators as "highly professional"; they had a higher sense of "power to influence decision-making outside of the classroom" than other teachers; and they demonstrated more "experimenting behavior" and stronger "group-identification" behavior than other teachers.

Self-Perception

The relationship between self-perception and attitude has been explored by educators, psychologists, sociologists and others. Some reviewers of these investigations have noted massive inconsistencies and contradictions in the literature (Wylie, 1974). For example, Gregen (1971) notes that while most research regards high self-esteem persons as ambitious and confident; some researchers have found a negative relationship between self-esteem and achievement motivation. Additionally, while much of the literature suggests a positive relationship between positive self-perception and competitiveness, some studies have found a negative relationship. One critic of self-perception literature commented on "the utter bankruptcy of it all" (Diggory, 1966).

Despite the inconclusiveness of much of the literature, there is strong support for the propositions that persons with a negative self-perception are generally more anxious to have others' acceptance and support and that they tend to view others negatively (Gregen, 1971). Additionally, a poor self-perception has been found to be associated with a sense of powerlessness and isolation in the work setting (Cedoline, 1982). And

has concluded that "Our aspirations depend on our estimates of self" (Gregen, 1971).

Summary

Although various forms of alternative compensation plans have been employed by school districts for decades, the research neither strongly supports nor condemns the concept of pay for performance. Researchers tend to agree theoretically with the premise, but they describe significant practical limitations with most types of plans. Career ladders is emerging as the newest and most publicized performance-pay system; however, monetary incentives and merit pay are also utilized in many districts. Nonmonetary incentives generally have been found to be the most effective motivators for teachers, but supplemental pay remains the most prevalent type of payment aside from the salary schedule.

Studies indicate that teachers traditionally have not supported alternative compensation plans although their position appears to have reversed somewhat in recent years. Other studies reveal that teachers do not believe teaching can be objectively measured and that performance-based pay may create disincentives and increase competition while diminishing collegiality.

The research on teacher characteristics suggests some differences between secondary and elementary teachers'

opinions of alternative compensation plans. Secondary teachers are slightly more supportive than elementary teachers.

The general research on teacher characteristics indicates that teachers' attitudes towards a variety of educational issues may be dependent upon specific teacher characteristics and/or upon the context in which the teacher is working.

CHAPTER III: METHODS

The Sample

The population for the study was the approximately 1,400 teachers (kindergarten - twelfth grade) from the 45 school districts that comprise the Arrowhead AEA 5 region of Iowa. These districts participated in the Phase III Project provided by the AEA. The experimental group was comprised of the approximately 135 teachers (three from each district) who were identified by their administrators to participate in their districts' Phase III development committees. (The function of these committees will be explained in the Procedures section of The control group was comprised of the this chapter.) approximately 1,235 teachers who did not participate in their districts' Phase III committees. Each of the 1400 teachers was sent a pretest survey and a posttest survey. However, only 377 teachers returned both surveys (54 teachers in the experimental group, 312 in the control group, and 11 who did not indicate in which group they belonged).

Demographic Information

Following is the demographic information (items 4 - 12 on the survey) regarding the sample population:

1. More than four-fifths of the survey respondents were in the control group of the project (Table 1).

Table 1. Demographic Information Regarding Survey
Participants: Participant (Experimental Group)
or Nonparticipant (Control Group) in a
District's Alternative Compensation Plan
Development Committee N = 373

	f	ક
Participant in Committee (experimental)	54	14.3
Nonparticipant (control)	312	82.8
Missing	11	2.9

2. Approximately two-thirds of the participants were females (Table 2).

Table 2. Demographic Information Regarding Survey Participants: Gender N = 377

		All	Expe	Experimental		rol
	f	용	f	용	f	ફ
Male	116	30.8	19	35.2	96	30.9
Female	259	68.7	35	64.8	215	69.1
Missing	2	.5	0	00.0	. 1	00.0
Total	377	100.0	54	100.0	312	100.0

3. Over forty percent of the respondents were elementary teachers (Table 3).

Table 3. Demographic Information Regarding Survey Participants: Grade Level Taught N = 373

	All		Experimental		Control	
	f	ફ	f	g _e	f	ક
Elementary	163	43.2	23	42.6	135	43.3
Middle School/Jr. High	51	13.5	8	14.8	42	13.5
High School	9	26.3	11	20.4	87	27.9
Combination of Levels	60	15.9	9	16.7	48	15.4
Missing	4	1.1	3	5.6	0	00.0
Total	37	100.0	54	100.0	312	100.0

4. Approximately ninety percent of the teachers had taught for four or more years (Table 4).

Table 4. Demographic Information Regarding Survey Participants: Years Teaching Experience N=377

	All	Ex	Experimental			ontrol
	f	용	£	용	f	용
1 - 3 years 4 - 11 years 12 - 19 years 20 or more years Missing Total	42 111 113 103 8 377	11.1 39.4 30.0 27.3 2.1 100.0	5 10 24 15 0 54	9.3 18.5 44.4 27.8 00.0 100.0	35 100 87 82 8 312	11.2 32.1 27.9 26.3 2.6 100.0

5. A majority of respondents indicated they took between two and five professional courses or workshops per year (Table 5).

Table 5. Demographic Information Regarding Survey Participants: Professional Courses or Workshops Taken Per Year N = 377

	All		Expe	rimental	Control		
	f	8	f	ફ	f	ફ	
<pre>0 - 1 per year 2 or more per year Missing Total</pre>	146 229 2 377	38.9 60.7 .5 100.0	13 41 0 54	24.1 76.0 00.0 100.0	127 183 2 312	40.7 58.7 .6 100.0	

6. More than three-fifths of the respondents indicated they did not hold second jobs outside the school district (Table 6).

Table 6. Demographic Information Regarding Survey Participants: Employment Outside District N=377

	All		Ехре	riment	al C	Control	
	f	용	f	웅	f	8	
Not Employed Outside District	234	62.1	32	59.3	195	62.5	
Enjoyment or Money for Extras	7 7	20.4	11	20.4	64	20.5	
Money for Necessities	53	14.1	L 9	16.7	42	13.5	
Missing	13	3.4	1 2	3.7	11	3.5	
Total	377	100.0	54	100.0	312	100.0	

7. The majority of respondents indicated they were "Enthusiastic" or "Interested" in changes in their work settings (Table 7).

Table 7. Demographic Information Regarding Survey Participants: Attitude Toward Change in the Work Setting N=377

	All		Experimental		Control	
	f	ક	f	ક્ર	f	ક
Enthusiastic or Interested	217	57.6	35	64.8	176	56.4
Neutral or Concerned	160	42.4	19	35.2	136	43.6
Missing	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
Total	377	100.0	54	100.0	312	100.0

8. Eighty percent of the respondents viewed themselves as "Above Average" teachers (Table 8).

Table 8. Demographic Information Regarding Survey
Participants: Self Perception as a Teacher N
= 377

	All		Experimental		Control	
	, f	용	f	용	f	ક
Exceptional Above Average Average or Below Ave. Missing Total	40 300 35 2 377	10.6 79.6 9.3 .5 100.0	6 47 1 0 54	11.1 87.0 1.9 0.0 100.0	32 243 34 0 312	10.3 78.2 10.9 .6 100.0

The Instrument

Two surveys, a pretest (Appendix A) and a posttest (Appendix B), were utilized in the study. (Some portions of the surveys incorporated items from a survey developed by the Wilmington, Deleware school district). pretest was comprised of 51 forced-choice questions divided into six sections. The first section (items 1-3) elicited teacher identification information for use in matching pretest and posttest surveys. That information included the last four digits of the teachers' social security numbers, their building assignments and the names of their districts. The second section was designed to elicit demographic information through the identification of nine personal and professional characteristics of the teachers (explained in the Sample section of this chapter). The third section consisted of 20 reward components (Table 9) which were to be rated on a five point scale from "Detrimental" to "Enhancing".

Table 9. Reward Components of Alternative Compensation Plans (Survey Items 13 - 32)

Item Reward Component

- 13. Compensation made on a basis other than a fixed salary schedule
- 14. Recognition and appreciation expressed by the administration
- 15. Tuition paid for graduate or college courses
- 16. Experienced teachers paid to function as "mentors"
- 17. Participation in a teacher exchange program with other districts or schools
- 18. Opportunities for expanded roles/new dimensions for teachers
- 19. Increased opportunities for professional growth
- 20. Nonmonetary recognition for professional growth
- 21. Increased compensation to teachers for continued professional growth
- 22. Additional compensation to teachers in a subject area where there is a shortage
- 23. Advanced study sabbaticals (at a reasonable funding level)
- 24. Incentives for individuals or groups to work on special projects
- 25. Opportunities for sharing a staff position
- 26. Staff development opportunities outside the school day
- 27. Release time for staff development activities
- 28. A cash bonus for outstanding performance in a particular area
- 29. Opportunities for participation in planning and decision-making
- 30. Opportunities to counsel/advise students or groups of students
- 31. Opportunities to observe other teachers to help them with classroom instruction, management and other concerns
- 32. Extended contracts for staff to work on school-related matters

The fourth section elicited teachers' ratings of 10 evaluation components (Table 10) on a five point scale from "Detrimental" to "Enhancing".

Table 10. Evaluation Components of Alternative Compensation Plans (Survey Items 33 - 42)

- Professional growth and the improvement of instruction is stressed
- Appropriate student growth is considered 2.
- Professional growth objectives are jointly set by the staff member and the evaluator
- An evaluation process is used that is different for new teachers than experienced teachers
- A test of teachers' knowledge of subject matter is included
- An evaluation process is used that is different for those teachers whose performance is unsatisfactory An evaluation of staff is made only by administrators
- 8. Peer evaluation is included with administrator evaluation
- Evaluation by students is included with administrator evaluation
- 10. Evaluation of staff by trained evaluators outside of the district is included

The fifth section required teachers to rate six alternative compensation plans on a five point scale from "Highly Undesirable" to "Highly Desirable". The six plans included "Merit Pay With Salary Schedule", "Merit Pay Without Salary Schedule", "Monetary Incentives", "Nonmonetary Incentives", "Career Ladders", and

"Supplemental Pay". The sixth section required teachers to rank the six alternative compensation plans from 1 (most desirable) to 6 (least desirable).

The posttest survey was comprised of only the first, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth sections. The second section, demographic information, was eliminated because it was not considered necessary for the analysis of the posttest data. An additional difference between the pretest and posttest surveys was in the fifth section, the rankings of six alternative compensation plans, (the ranking portion of items 43-48). On the posttest this section was placed on a separate page rather than on the page with the fourth section as it had been on the pretest.

The Procedure

During the first week of September 1987 the pretest survey was sent by van mail from Arrowhead AEA 5 to every teacher in the 45 school districts within that region (approximately 1,400 teachers). The teachers were asked to return the surveys by September 10.

On September 10 the approximately 135 teachers participating in their districts' Phase III development committees (the experimental group) met for the first

time to begin the process of: (a) learning about alternative compensation plans and (b) developing plans for their districts. District Phase III committees generally consisted of teachers, administrators, and school board members or citizens. Each district's committee participated in the Phase III Project sponsored by Arrowhead Area Education Agency (AEA) 5 in Fort Dodge, Iowa. The project was designed to assist school districts in that AEA region in the development of performance-based and supplemental pay plans for submission to the State Department of Education for approval and subsequent funding.

An initial meeting of the Phase III Project was held at a hotel restaurant and included dinner (at the AEA's expense) and three speakers — a representative of the Iowa State Teachers Association, a representative of the Iowa Department of Education involved with Phase III, and Dr. James Sweeney, Section Head of Education Administration at Iowa State University.

During the next three and a half months, the Phase III committee members participated in three day-long workshops (lasting from 9:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m.) conducted by Dr. Sweeney. According to Dr. Sweeney, the purposes of the workshops were (a) to provide information

regarding performance-based and incentive pay plans, and
(b) to encourage districts to try alternative pay plans.
The workshops' format included:

- Formal presentations regarding the nature of various alternative compensation plans with an emphasis on merit pay and monetary compensation plans.
- Opportunities for district committees to dialogue and plan
- 3. Opportunities for participants from various districts to dialogue in small groups
- 4. Information regarding criterion-referenced measures of student achievement as a basis for teacher evaluation.
- Opportunities for questions and concerns to be voiced and discussed
- 6. Examples of sample Phase III plans with accompanying guidelines

Phase III plans were submitted to the State

Department of Education for approval by January 1, 1988.

Each of the 45 plans submitted by the districts in AEA 5 was approved.

During the third week of January, the posttest survey was sent to all teachers in both the experimental and control groups with the request that it be returned by the second week of February.

Design and Analysis of Data

A quasi-experimental design was utilized in the experimental portion of the study (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Quasi-experimental Design

Teachers' responses on the pretest to the rating and ranking portions of items 43-48 showed discrepancies; therefore, a chi-square test was run on items 43-48 to determine the relationship between teachers' ratings of plans and their rankings of plans. Analysis of the chi square test revealed a weak relationship between the two, and it was concluded that the ranking section on the pretest had been completed incorrectly by a significant number of teachers rendering it invalid. Therefore, before the posttest was administered the ranking section was rewritten with clearer directions and placed on a page separate from the rating section.

Descriptive statistics which provided frequencies, means, and standard deviations were computed to determine the relative value of the study variables. Teachers' ratings of the 20 reward components, the 10 evaluation components and the six alternative compensation plans were computed using descriptive statistics.

One-way analysis of variance tests were used to determine whether teachers with certain characteristics differ in their ratings of alternative compensation plans from teachers with other characteristics. characteristics studied included: years teaching experience, number of professional courses or workshops taken annually, employment outside the school district, attitude toward change, and self-perception as a teacher (Hypotheses 1 - 5). Analysis of variance was utilized to determine the interaction effect between gender and grade level taught for the variable teacher ratings of alternative compensation plans (Hypothesis 6, 7, and 8). A t-test (pairs) was run to determine whether teachers who participate in the development of a district's plan show significant changes in their ratings of types of alternative compensation plans after the development of the plan (Hypothesis 8). And a t-test (pairs) was run to determine whether teachers who do not participate in the

development of a plan show significant changes in their ratings of alternative compensation plans after the development of their districts' plans (Hypotheses 9).

CHAPTER IV: FINDINGS

This chapter is divided into four sections: Teacher Ratings of Reward Components of Alternative Compensation Plans; Teacher Ratings of Evaluation Components of Alternative Compensation Plans; Teacher Ratings of Alternative Compensation Plans; and Tests of Hypotheses. The first three sections address the first three objectives of the study (stated in Chapter I), and the fourth section addresses the last three objectives of the study.

Teacher Ratings of Reward Components of Alternative Compensation Plans

This section addresses objective #1 of the study:
to determine teachers' ratings of the reward components
of alternative compensation plans prior to districts'
initiating activities to develop alternative compensation
plans. Survey items 13 - 32 asked teachers to rate
twenty reward components (see "Instruments" section of
Chapter III) on a scale from 1 = "Detrimental" to 5 =
"Enhancing". The pretest means and standard deviations
for teachers' ratings of reward components are provided
in Table 11. The frequency distributions are provided in
Appendix C.

The reward component "Increased Compensation to Teachers for Continued Professional Growth" (item 21 on the survey) received the highest rating (M = 4.40; SD = .72). The reward component with the lowest rating was item 22, "Additional Compensation to Teachers in a Subject Area Where There is a Present Shortage of Teachers" (M = 2.99; SD = 1.22).

Table 11. Pretest Means and Standard Deviations for Reward Components of Alternative Compensation Plans (Items 13 - 32 on the Survey)

Item	Reward Components	Mean	SD
13.	Other Than Fixed Compensation	3.04	1.15
14.	Recognition by Administration	3.89	1.22
15.	Tuition for College Courses	4.27	1.03
16.	Teachers Paid as "Mentors"	3.72	.92
17.	Teacher Exchange Programs	3.20	.99
18.	Expanded Roles/Shared Positions	3.81	.79
19.	Professional Growth Activities	4.38	.66
20.	Nonmonetary recognition	3.46	1.09
21.	Money for Professional Growth	4.40	.72
22.	Extra Pay for Teacher Shortage	2.99	1.22
23.	Sabbaticals	3.72	.88
24.	Incentives for Special Projects	4.17	.73
25.	Opportunities to Share Positions		.90
26.	Sharing Staff Positions	3.56	.96
27.	Release Time for Staff Dev.	4.25	.71
28.	Cash Bonus for Performance	3.23	1.28
29.	Planning Opportunities	4.25	. 65
30.	Counseling/Advising Studnets	3.71	.78
31.	Observing/Helping Other Teachers		.98
32.	Extended Contracts	4.39	.74
·			- · ·

Teacher Ratings of Evaluation Components of Alternative Compensation Plans

This section addresses objective #2 of the study:
to determine teachers' ratings of the evaluation
components of alternative compensation plans. Teachers
were asked to rate 10 evaluation components from 1 =
"Detrimimental" to 5 = "Enhancing". The pretest means
and standard deviations for ratings of evaluation
components of alternative compensation plans are provided
in Table 12. Appendix D provides the frequency
distributions for this section of the pretest survey.

The Evaluation component receiving the highest rating was item 33, "Professional Growth and the Improvement of Instruction is Stressed" (M = 4.14; SD = .70). The evaluation component receiving the lowest rating was item 38, "An Evaluation Process is Used that is Different for Those Teachers Whose Performance is Unsatisfactory" (M = 2.62; SD. = 1.05).

Table 12. Pretest Means and Standard Deviations for Evaluation Components of Alternative Compensation Plans (Items 33 - 42)

Item Evaluation Components	Mean	SD
33. Professional Growth Stressed 34. Student Growth Considered 35. Growth Objectives Jointly Set 36. Evals Different for New Teachers 37. Test of Subject Matter Included 38. Different Form for Unsatisfactory 39. Evaluation Only by Administrators 40. Peer Evaluation Included 41. Student Evaluation Included 42. Outside Evaluators Included	4.18 3.60 4.06 3.25 2.74 2.59 2.74 2.98 2.68 3.26	.70 .97 .81 1.04 1.12 1.05 1.15 1.13 1.07

Teacher Ratings of Alternative Compensation Plans
This section addresses objective #3 of the study: to
determine teachers' ratings of six alternative
compensation plans. The rating portion of survey items
43 - 48 asked teachers to rate six alternative
compensation plans on a five point scale from 1 = "Highly
Undesirable" to 5 = "Highly Desirable". The types of
plans included: Merit Pay With Salary Schedule, Merit
Pay Without Salary Schedule, Monetary Incentives,
Nonmonetary Incentives, Career Ladders, and Supplemental
Pay. The pretest survey means and standard deviations
for teachers' ratings of the plans are provided in

Table 13. Appendix E provides the frequency distributions for this section of the pretest survey.

The type of plan which received the highest rating was Supplemental Pay (M = 3.86; SD = 1.03). The type of plan receiving the lowest rating was Merit Pay Without Salary Schedule (M = 1.80; SD = .98).

Table 13. Pretest Means and Standard Deviations for Teacher Ratings of Alternative Compensation Plans (The Rating Portion of Items 43 - 48 on the Survey)

Item	Type of Plan	Mean	SD
43.	Merit Pay With Salary Schedule	2.78	1.29
44.	Merit Pay W/O Salary Schedule	1.80	.98
45.	Monetary Incentives	3.80	.96
46.	Nonmonetary Incentives	3.35	1.02
47.	Career Ladders	3.58	.93
48.	Supplemental Pay	3.86	1.03

Inferential Statistics

Hypotheses

This section reports findings on the ten hypotheses tested in this study (objectives 4, 5, and 6). The tests involve the study of teachers' ratings of six alternative compensation plans: "Merit Pay With Salary Schedule", "Merit Pay Without Salary Schedule", "Monetary

Incentives", "Nonmonetary Incentives", "Career Ladders", and "Supplemental Pay".

Hypotheses testing

Research Hypothesis One was designed to determine whether teachers in four categories of "Years Teaching Experience" differ in their ratings of each alternative compensation plan.

HO1: Prior to districts' initiating activities to develop alternative compensation plans, there is no significant difference in teachers' ratings of each alternative compensation plan (the rating portion of items 43 - 48 on the survey) between teachers in the following categories:

(a) teachers with 0-3 years teaching experience,
(b) teachers with 4-11 years teaching experience, (c) teachers with 12 -19 years experience, and teachers with 20 - 41 years experience (item 7 on the survey.)

The average ratings for each plan provided by teachers in the different categories of teaching experience are presented in Table 14. Appendix F presents the results of the one-way analysis of variance test of the null hypothesis for each plan (i.e., for the means for each row of the table). The results revealed no statistically significant differences for any plan. The null hypothesis was not rejected.

Table 14. Pretest average ratings of alternative compensation plans by categories of years teaching experience

TYPE YEARS TEACHING EXPERIENCE OF													
PLAN	a 0	- 3		•	4 - 13	Ĺ	:	12 - 19			20 - 41		
	М	SD	n	M	SD	n	M	SD	n	M	SD	n	
43	2.72	1.30	36	2.83	1.29	95	2.70	1.27	105	2.79	1.31	90	
44	1.94	1.15	36	1.81	. 95	93	1.74	.98	105	1.79	.96	89	
45	3.80	.68	35	3.80	1.05	94	3.70	1.01	105	3.94	.87	90	
46	3.36	.96	36	3.34	1.06	94	3.25	1.01	105	3.44	1.05	89	
47	3.36	.87	36	3.60	. 95	95	3.69	.98	104	3.49	.90	90	
48	3.89	1.26	36	3.96	.88	94	3.80	1.10	105	3.77	.97	90	

a Survey item number representing the type of alternative compensation plan

Survey Item No.	Type of Plan
43	Merit Pay With Salary Schedule
44	Merit Pay Without Salary Schedule
45	Monetary Incentives
46	Nonmonetary Incentives
47	Career Ladders
48	Supplemental Pay.

Research Hypothesis Two was developed to determine whether teachers in two categories of "Number of Professional Courses or Workshops Taken Per Year" differ in their ratings of each alternative compensation plan.

HO2: Prior to districts' initiating activities to develop alternative compensation plans, there is no significant difference in teachers' ratings of each alternative compensation plan (the rating portion of items 43 - 48 on the survey) between teachers in the following categories:

(a) teachers who participate in 0-1 professional courses or workshops per year, and (b) teachers who participate in 2 or more professional courses or workshops per year (item 8 on the survey).

The average ratings for each plan provided by teachers in the different categories of teaching experience are presented in Table 15. Appendix F presents the results of the one-way analysis of variance test of the null hypothesis for each plan (i.e., for the means for each row of the table). Statistical significance was found in two instances. In the first case, teachers who participated in two or more professional courses or workshops per year rated "Merit Pay Without Salary Schedule" higher than teachers who took zero or one professional course or workshop per The test was significant at the .05 level. In the second case, teachers who participated in zero or one professional course or workshop per year rated "Supplemental Pay" higher than teachers who participated in two or more professional courses or workshops per year. The test was significant at the .01 level.

Table 15. Pretest average ratings of alternative compensation plans by categories of professional courses or workshops taken per year

	PROFESSIONAL	COURSES	OR WORK	SHOPS TAKE	N PER	YEAR
TYPE OF PLAN ^a	0	- 1		2 0	r More	
	M	SD	n	М	SD	n
43	2.64	1.24	129	2.87	1.31	202
44	1.61	.88	128	1.92	1.02	200**
45	3.81	.95	127	3.79	.97	202
46	3.38	.98	128	3.32	1.06	201
47	3.54	.92	129	3.61	.95	201
48	4.00	.94	129	3.77	1.07	201*

a Survey item number representing the type of alternative compensation plan

Survey Item	No. Type of Plan
43	Merit Pay With Salary Schedule
44	Merit Pay Without Salary Schedule
45	Monetary Incentives
46	Nonmonetary Incentives
47	Career Ladders
48	Supplemental Pay.

^{*}Significant at the .05 level. **Significant at the .01 level.

Research Hypothesis Three was designed to determine whether teachers in three categories of "Employment Outside School District" differ in their ratings of each alternative compensation plan.

HO3: Prior to districts' initiating activities to develop alternative compensation plans, there is no significant difference in teacher ratings of each alternative compensation plan (the rating portion of items 43 - 48 on the survey) between teachers in the following categories: (a) teachers who are not employed outside the school district, (b) teachers who work outside the school district for enjoyment or to earn money for extras, and (c) teachers who work outside the school district in order to earn money for necessities (item 9 on the survey).

The average ratings for each plan provided by teachers in the different categories of attitude toward change are presented in Table 16. Appendix F presents the results of the analysis of variance test of the null hypothesis (i.e., for the means for each row of the table). No statistical significance was found. The null hypothesis was not rejected.

Table 16. Pretest average ratings of alternative compensation plans by categories of employment outside school district

	DME II					DISTR	ICT	
					_	To Earn Money For Necessities		
M	SD	n	M	SD	n	M	SD	n
2.68	1.27	208	3.06	1.30	66	2.87	1.35	47
1.77	1.00	208	1.98	1.05	66	1.74	.82	47
3.72	.99	206	3.83	.99	66	4.00	.78	47
3.36	1.04	207	3.23	.93	65	3.21	1.06	47
3.56	.92	207	3.58	.90	66	3.66	1.05	47
3.85	1.10	207	3.83	.94	66	3.94	.82	47
	M 2.68 1.77 3.72 3.36 3.56	M SD 2.68 1.27 1.77 1.00 3.72 .99 3.36 1.04 3.56 .92	Not Employed Dutside District M SD n 2.68 1.27 208 1.77 1.00 208 3.72 .99 206 3.36 1.04 207 3.56 .92 207	Not Employed To E Dutside District Fo M SD n M 2.68 1.27 208 3.06 1.77 1.00 208 1.98 3.72 .99 206 3.83 3.36 1.04 207 3.23 3.56 .92 207 3.58	Not Employed To Earn Montage District For Extr. M SD n M SD 2.68 1.27 208 3.06 1.30 1.77 1.00 208 1.98 1.05 3.72 .99 206 3.83 .99 3.36 1.04 207 3.23 .93 3.56 .92 207 3.58 .90	M SD n M SD n 2.68 1.27 208 3.06 1.30 66 1.77 1.00 208 1.98 1.05 66 3.72 .99 206 3.83 .99 66 3.36 1.04 207 3.23 .93 65 3.56 .92 207 3.58 .90 66	Not Employed Dutside District To Earn Money For No. To Money For No. To Money For No. To Money For No. To Earn Money For No. To Money F	Not Employed Dutside District To Earn Money For Necession To Earn Money For Necession To Earn Money For Necession M SD n M SD n M SD 2.68 1.27 208 3.06 1.30 66 2.87 1.35 1.77 1.00 208 1.98 1.05 66 1.74 .82 3.72 .99 206 3.83 .99 66 4.00 .78 3.36 1.04 207 3.23 .93 65 3.21 1.06 3.56 .92 207 3.58 .90 66 3.66 1.05

 $^{^{\}rm a}$ Survey item number representing the type of alternative compensation plan. N = 377

Survey Item No.	Type of Plan
43	Merit Pay With Salary Schedule
44	Merit Pay Without Salary Schedule
45	Monetary Incentives
46	Nonmonetary Incentives
47	Career Ladders
48	Supplemental Pay.

Research Hypothesis Four was developed to determine whether teachers in two categories of "Attitude Toward Change" differ in their ratings of each alternative compensation plan.

HO4: Prior to districts' initiating activities to develop alternative compensation plans, there is no significant difference in teachers' ratings of each alternative compensation plan (the rating portion of items 43 - 48 on the survey) between teachers in the following categories for the variable "attitude toward change": (a) teachers who describe themselves as "Enthusiastic" or "Interested" in changes in their work setting, and (b) teachers who describe themselves as "Neutral", "Concerned", or "Very Concerned" about changes in their work setting (item 11 on the survey).

The average ratings for each plan provided by teachers in the different categories of attitude toward change are presented in Table 17. Appendix F presents the results of the one-way analysis of variance test of the null hypothesis for each plan (ie., for the means for each row of the table). Statistical significance was found in one instance. Teachers who indicated they are "Enthusiastic" or "Interested" in changes in their work settings rated "Merit Pay Without Salary Schedule" higher than teachers who indicated they are "Neutral", "Concerned", or "Very Concerned" about changes in their work settings. The test was significant at the .05 level.

Table 17. Pretest ratings of alternative compensation plans by categories of attitude toward change in the work setting

	ATTITUDE T	OWARD C	HANGE IN	THE WORK	SETTING	
TYPE OF PLAN ^a	Enthusi	astic/Iı	ntereste		ral/Concern	
	M	SD	n	М	SD	n
43	2.87	1.28	189	2.6	1.29	144
44	1.92	.99	186	1.6	.95	144*
45	3.85	.93	187	3.7	73 1.00	144
46	3.39	1.03	189	3.3	35 1.02	142
47	3.62	.87	188	3.5	.9	144
48	3.83	1.03	189	3.9	0 1.02	143

a Survey item number representing the type of alternative compensation plan

Survey Item No.	Type of Plan
43 44	Merit Pay With Salary Schedule Merit Pay Without Salary Schedule
45	Monetary Incentives
46	Nonmonetary Incentives
47	Career Ladders
48	Supplemental Pay.

^{*}Significant at the .05 level.

Research Hypothesis Five was developed to determine whether teachers in three categories of "Self-perception as a Teacher" differ in their ratings of each alternative compensation plan.

HO5: Prior to districts' initiating activities to develop alterntive compensation plans, there is no significant difference in teachers' ratings of each alternative compensation plan (the ratings portion of items 43 - 48 on the survey) between teachers in the following categories: (a) teachers who perceive themselves as "Exceptional", (b) teachers who perceive themselves as "Above Average", and (c) teachers who perceive themselves as "Average" or "Below Average" (item 12 on the survey).

The average ratings for each plan provided by
teachers in the different categories of self-perception
as a teacher are presented in Table 18. Appendix F
presents the results of the one-way analysis of variance
test of the null hypothesis for each plan (ie., for the
means for each row of the table). In two instances
statistical significance was found. In the first case,
teachers who described themselves as "Above Average"
rated "Nonmonetary Incentives" higher than teachers who
described themselves as "Average" or "Below Average".
The test was significant at the .01 level. In the second
case, teachers who described themselves as "Above
Average" rated "Supplemental Pay" higher than

teachers who described themselves as "Exceptional". The test was significant at the .05 level.

Table 18. Pretest average ratings of alternative compensation plans by categories of self-perception as a teacher

TYPE	SELF-PERCEPTION AS A TEACHER											
OF PLAN ^a	Exc	eption	al	Abov	e Aver	Average/ Below Average						
	M	SD	n	M	SD	n	М	SD	n			
43	3.03	1.42	37	2.72	1.27	265	2.97	1.32	29			
44	2.05	1.20	37	1.78	.94	263	1.76	1.09	29			
45	3.68	1.18	37	3.81	.92	263	3.86	1.06	29			
46	3.22	1.10	36	3.43	.99	264	2.76	1.15	29**			
47	3.54	1.24	37	3.60	.91	264	3.45	.78	29			
48	3.43	1.12	37	3.92	1.02	264	3.83	.89	29*			

 $^{^{\}rm a}$ Survey item number representing the type of alternative compensation plan

Survey Ite	em No.	Type of Plan	
43	Merit	Pay With Sal	lary Schedule
44	Merit	Pay Without	Salary Schedule
45	Moneta	ary Incentive	es
46	Nonmoi	netary Incent	tives
47	Caree	r Ladders	
48	Supple	emental Pay.	

^{*}Significant at the .05 level. **Significant at the .01 level.

Research Hypothesis Six was developed to determine whether males differ from females in their ratings of each alternative compensation plan. The plans were rated from 1 (Highly Undesirable) to 5 (Highly Desirable).

HO6: Prior to districts' initiating activities to develop alternative compensation plans, male and female teachers (item 5 on the survey) do not differ significantly in their ratings of each alternative compensation plan (the rating portion of items 43-48 on the survey).

Two-way analysis of variance was used to test the null hypothesis for each plan (Appendix G). The means and standard deviations for the ratings of males and females are shown in the bottom row of Tables 19 through 24. Gender was found to be significant for each of the four plans as follows: males rated "Merit Pay With Salary Schedule" higher than females (Table 19); and females rated "Nonmonetary Incentives" (Table 20) and "Career Ladders" (Table 21) higher than males (.05 level of significance); and males rated "Merit Pay Without Salary Schedule" higher than females (.01 level of significance) (Table 22). The null hypothesis was rejected.

Table 19. Pretest means and standard deviations of a two-way analysis of variance test of ratings of "Merit Pay With Salary Schedule" (Item 43) by gender by grade taught

GRADE LEVEL									
TAUGHT	М	ales		Fe	males		Overall		
	М	SD	n	M	SD	n	М	SD	n
Elementary	2.60	1.64	15	2.72	1.33	130	1.86	1.22	145
Junior High	3.09	1.24	23	2.55	1.09	22	1.67	1.25	45
Senior High	3.11	1.79	44	2.77	1.28	39	1.80	1.42	83
Combination Of Levels	n 3.25	1.41	16	2.33	1.30	30	1.78	1.27	46
Overall	3.05	1.34	98	2.66	1.24	221	2.78	1.28	319

Table 20. Pretest means and standard deviations of a two-way analysis of variance test of ratings of "Nonmonetary Incentives" (Item 46) by gender by grade taught

GRADE				GENDER					
LEVEL TAUGHT	М	ales		Fe	males		Overall		
	M	SD	n	М	SD	n	М	SD	n
Elementary	3.13	.95	15	3.61	.98	130	3.56	.92	145
Junior High	3.04	1.10	23	3.41	.90	22	3.22	.98	45
Senior High	3.25	1.00	44	3.08	.87	39	3.17	. 95	83
Combination Of Levels	n 2.56	1.12	16	3.57	.94	30	3.22	1.03	46
Overall	3.07	1.09	98	3.49	. 92	221	3.36	.87	319

Table 21. Pretest means and standard deviations of a two-way analysis of variance test of ratings of "Career Ladders" (Item 47) by gender by grade taught

GRADE								
TAUGHT	LEVEL Males			Females		Overall		
	M	SD	n	M SD	n	M SD n		
Elementary	2.73	1.03	15	3.65 .9	2 130	3.55 .97 145		
Junior High	3.48	1.00	23	3.45 .9	0 22	3.47 .92 45		
Senior High	3.66	.98	44	3.67 .8	9 39	3.66 .92 83		
Combination Of Levels	3.50	1.04	16	3.80 .9	9 30	3.70 .90 46		
Overall	3.45	1.01	98	3.65 .9	0 221	3.59 .93 319		

Table 22. Pretest means and standard deviations of a two-way analysis of variance test of ratings of "Merit Pay Without Salary Schedule" (Item 47) by gender by grade taught

GRADE										
LEVEL TAUGHT	Ma	les		Females				Overall		
	M	SD	n	М	SD	n	М	SD	n	
Elementary	2.13	1.00	15	1.82	.95	130	1.86	.97	145	
Junior High	1.83	1.05	23	1.50	.90	22	1.67	.95	45	
Senior High	1.95	1.10	44	1.62	. 92	39	1.80	1.03	83	
Combinatio Of Levels	n 2.06	1.11	16	1.63	.91	30	1.78	.91	46	
Overall	1.97	1.09	98	1.73	.92	221	1.80	.97	319	

Table 23. Pretest means and standard deviations of two-way analysis of variance test of ratings of "Monetary Incentives" (Item 45) by gender by grade taught

GRADE	GENDER									
LEVEL TAUGHT	Ma	les		Females				Overall		
	M	SD	n	M	SD	n	M	SD	n	
Elementary	3.47	1.00	15	3.77	.93	130	3.74	.96	145	
Junior High	4.17	1.04	23	3.55	.98	22	3.87	.99	45	
Senior High	3.84	.98	44	3.64	1.04	39	3.75	1.02	83	
Combination Of Levels	4.25	.90	16	3.73	.80	30	3.91	.84	46	
Overall	3.93	1.00	98	3.72	.94	221	3.78	.96	319	

Table 24. Pretest survey results of two-way analysis of variance test of ratings of "Supplemental Pay" (Item 4) by gender by grade taught

GRADE LEVEL				GENDE	R				
TAUGHT	Males			Females			Overall		
	M	SD	n	М	SD	n	М	SD	n
Elementary	3.67	1.05	15	3.82	. 95	134	3.81	1.00	149
Junior High	4.04	1.01	23	3.71	.99	21	3.89	1.03	44
Senior High	3.96	1.07	45	3.88	1.01	41	3.92	.94	86
Combination Of Levels	n 3.88	.97	16	4.00	1.03	31	3.96	. 98	46
Overall	3.92	1.03	99	3.85	.98	227	3.87	.99	326

Research Hypothesis Seven was developed to determine whether teachers at various grade levels differ in their ratings of each alternative compensation plan. Grade level taught refers to the following four categories:

(a) elementary, (b) middle school or junior high, (c) high school, or (d) a combination of levels. Ratings of each alternative compensation plan refers to teachers ratings of six alternative compensation plans from 1 (the most desirable type of plan) to 6 (the least desirable type of plan).

HO7: Prior to districts' initiating activities to develop alternative compensation plans, teachers' ratings of each alternative compensation plan (the rating portion of items 43-48 on the survey) do not differ according to the grade level at which they teach (item 6 on the survey).

Two-way analysis of variance was used to test the null hypothesis (Appendix G). The means and standard deviations for the ratings of grade level taught are shown in the right hand columns of Tables 19 through 24. The variable grade level taught was not statistically significant in any of the tests.

Research Hypothesis Eight was developed to determine whether there is an interaction effect between gender and grade level taught for the dependent variable of teachers' ratings of each alternative compensation plan. Grade level taught refers to the following four categories: (a) elementary, (b) middle school or junior high, (c) high school, or (d) a combination of levels. Ratings of each alternative compensation plan refers to teachers' ratings of six alternative compensation plans from 1 (the most desirable type of plan) to 6 (the least desirable type of plan).

HO8: Prior to districts' initiating activities to develop alternative compensation plans, there is no interaction effect between gender and grade level taught when examining teacher

ratings of each alternative compensation plan (the rating portion of items 43 - 48 on the survey).

The means and standard deviations for the ratings of males and females by grade level taught are shown in Tables 19 through 24. Two-way analysis of variance was used to test the null hypothesis (Appendix G). An interaction of the two variables was significant at the .05 level in two instances. In the first case, female elementary and female junior high teachers and those who taught a combination of levels rated "Nonmonetary Incentives" higher than males who taught at those levels; however, males who taught at the senior high level rated "Nonmonetary Incentives" higher than females at that grade level (Table 20).

The second interaction effect was found at the .05 level for ratings of "Career Ladders" (Table 21).

Females who taught at the following three grade levels: elementary, senior high, and a combination of levels, rated "Career Ladders" higher than males who taught at those grade levels. However, male junior high teachers rated "Career Ladders" higher than female junior high teachers.

Research Hypothesis Nine was designed to determine whether teachers who participate in the development of

their district alternative compensation plans (the experimental group) change their ratings of each alternative compensation plan after participating in the development of their district's alternative compensation plan.

HO9: Teachers who are members of their districts' committees to develop alternative compensation plans (item 4 on the survey) indicate no significant changes in their ratings of each alternative compensation plan (the rating portion of items 43 - 48 on the survey) before and after the development of the plans.

A t-Test Groups was run using the experimental and control groups' pretest survey ratings for each type of alternative compensation plan. The results indicated there were no significant differences between the two groups' ratings of any plan prior to the development of the district alternative compensation plans.

A t-Test Pairs was used to test the null hypothesis (Table 25). Changes at the .05 level of significance were found in teachers' ratings of "Merit Pay With Salary Schedule" and "Monetary Incentives". Teachers who participated in the development of their district's alternative compensation plans rated "Merit Pay With Salary Schedule" and "Monetary incentives" significantly higher on the posttest than on the pretest survey.

Table 25. Pretest and posttest results of the t-Test (pairs) of ratings (1 - low to 5 - high) of alternative compensation plans for experimental and control groups

	E	xperim	ental	(N=45)		Contro	L (N=26	57)
Type of Plan ^a	м	SD Va	t- lue P	rob.	М	SD V	t- alue E	Prob.
Preb 2 Post 3	.67 1 .09 1	.41 -2 .13	.04 .	048*	2.79 2.94	1.26 -: 1.25	1.83 .0)69
44 Pre Post				.095		.98	.94	.347
45 Pre Post		.87 1.16	2.38	.022*	3.79 3.81	.96 1.00	15	.884
46 Pre Post		1.10		.701		1.02	-2.63	.009**
47 Pre Post		.96 .88		.868	3.57 3.61			.554
48 Pre Post	3.89 3.98		50	.617		1.01	-4.13	.000***

a Survey item number for type of plan

Survey Item No.	Type of Plan
43	Merit Pay With Salary Schedule
44	Merit Pay Without Salary Schedule
45	Monetary Incentives
46	Nonmonetary Incentives
47	Career Ladders
48	Supplemental Pay.

bpre = Results of prestest survey.
Cpost = Results of posttest survey.
*Significant at the .05 level.
**Significant at the .01 level.
***Significant at the .001 level.

Research Hypothesis Ten was designed to determine whether teachers who do not participate in the development of their district's plan (the control group) significantly change their ratings of each alternative compensation plan after the development of their district's plans.

HO10: Teachers who are not members of their districts' committees to develop alternative compensation plans (item 4 on the survey) indicate no significant changes in their ratings of each alternative compensation plan (the rating portion of items 43 - 48 on the survey) before and after the development of the plans.

A t-Test Pairs was used to test the null hypothesis (Table 25). Teachers who did not participate in the development of their districts' plans (the control group) rated "Nonmonetary Incentives" higher on the posttest than they had on the pretest (.01 level of significance). Additionally, they rated "Supplemental Pay" higher on the posttest than they had on the pretest (.001 level of significance).

CHAPTER V: CONCLUSIONS, DISCUSSION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Increasing numbers of school districts are moving beyond the traditional salary schedule and implementing various types of alternative compensation plans for teachers (Bray et al., 1985). The most prevelant types of plans include: merit pay, monetary incentives, nonmonetary incentives, career laddders, and supplemental pay (Duttweiler & Ramos-Cancel, 1986). Performance-based pay plans base teachers' pay wholely or partly on work quality or performance and include all of the aforementioned types of plans except supplemental pay. Supplemental pay is generally regarded as extra pay for extra work (Tyler, Texas Independent School District, 1984).

Authorities have indicated that teacher input is an essential element in the development of a successful alternative compensation plan (Flannelly & Palaich, 1985; Boyles & Vrchota, 1986). However, few studies have closely examined the issue of teachers' opinions of alternative compensation plans.

The purposes of this study were: (a) to determine teachers' ratings of alternative compensation plans and of their reward and evaluation components; (b) to

determine whether teachers with certain characteristics prefer different types of alternative compensation plans than teachers with other characteristics; and (c) to ascertain whether teachers' ratings of alternative compensation plans change after the development of their districts' plans.

Conclusions Related to Teachers' Ratings of Alternative Compensation Plans and Their Reward And Evaluation Components

The first objective of the study was to determine teachers' ratings of the reward components of alternative compensation plans prior to the development of their district alternative compensation plans. The reward component which was rated highest (on a scale of 1 = Detrimental to 5 = Enhancing) on the pretest survey was "Increased compensation to teachers for continued professional growth". The component which was rated the lowest was "Additional compensation to educators in a subject area where there is a present shortage of teachers".

The second objective of the study was to determine teachers' ratings of the evaluation components of alternative compensation plans prior to the development of their district alternative compensation plans.

Teachers' highest rated evaluation component on the pretest survey was "Professional growth and improvement of instruction is stressed". The lowest rated evaluation component was "An evaluation process is used that is different for those teachers whose performance is unsatisfactory".

The third objective of the study was to determine teachers' ratings of six alternative compensation plans prior to the development of district alternative compensation plans. Following is the list of the six plans based on teachers' ratings (from highest to lowest) on the pretest survey: "Supplemental Pay"; "Monetary Incentives"; "Career Ladders"; "Nonmonetary Incentives"; "Merit Pay With Salary Schedule"; "Merit Pay Without Salary Schedule".

Discussion

Teachers preferred reward and evaluation components which stressed professional growth. These results appear consistent with previous research which indicates that teacher attrition is related to a lack of opportunity for professional growth (Rosenholtz & Smylie, 1983; District of Columbia School District, 1984; and Flannelly & Palaich, 1984).

The teachers' responses may suggest that they regard themselves as inadequately prepared in certain areas, and/or that they view alternative compensation programs as viable opportunities for enhancement of their professional skills.

The teachers were least supportive of components which focused on issues other than professional growth such as extra pay for working in an area in which there is a teacher shortage, a different evaluation system for unsatisfactory teachers, and tests of subject matter knowledge. Teachers may have perceived these components as secondary to or interfering with an emphasis on professional growth and, therefore, rated them unfavorably.

The teachers' ratings of alternative compensation plans were consistent with reports of teachers' ratings of plans nationwide. Merit pay was rated lowest on this survey as it has been in other studies (Gallup; Ogletree; 1984, 1985). The glaring absence of successful merit pay programs to serve as prototypes may have led the participants in this study to oppose developing such plans in their districts. Additionally, the teachers may have regarded the potential negative effects of merit pay (e.g., competitiveness, inadequate evaluation, lowered

morale, etc.) to outweigh the potential benefits (e.g., additional money for outstanding teachers, a compensation system which is similar to other professions, etc.).

Conclusions Related To Teacher Characteristics and Ratings of Alternative Compensation Plans

The fourth objective of the study was to determine whether teachers with certain characteristics differ in their ratings of alternative compensation plans from teachers with other characteristics. Hypotheses 1 through 8 were included in this objective.

The teacher characteristic examined in Hypothesis 1 was "Years Teaching Experience". Four categories of this variable were studied: 0-4 years experience; 5-11 years experience; 12-19 years experience; and 20-41 years experience. There were no significant differences among categories for ratings of alternative compensation plans.

The teacher characteristic examined in Hypothesis 2 was "Number of Professional Courses or Workshops Taken Per Year". The two categories of this variable were: 0-1 courses or workshops per year; and 2 or more courses or workshops per year. Teachers who participated in no courses or workshops or one course or workshop per year rated "Supplemental Pay" higher than teachers who

participated in two or more courses or workshops per year. Additionally, teachers who participated in two or more courses or workshops per year rated "Merit Pay Without Salary Schedule" higher than teachers who took no courses or one course or workshop per year.

"Employment Outside the School District" was the teacher characteristic studied in Hypothesis 3. The three categories of the variable were: "Not Employed Outside the District"; "Employed Outside the School District for Enjoyment or in Order to Earn Money for Extras"; and "Employed Outside the School District in Order to Earn Money for Necessities". There were no significant differences between categories for ratings of alternative compensation plans.

The teacher characteristic studied in Hypothesis 4
was "Attitude Toward Change in the Work Setting". The
two categories of the variable were: teachers who
described themselves as "Enthusiastic" or "Interested";
and teachers who descirbed themselves as "Neutral",
"Concerned", or "Very Concerned". Teachers who indicated
they were "Enthusiastic" or "Interested" in changes in
their work setting rated "Merit Pay Without Salary
Schedule" higher than teachers who indicated they were
"Neutral", "Concerned", or "Very Concerned".

"Self-perception as a Teacher" was the teacher characteristic studied in Hypothesis 5. The three categories of the variable were: "Exceptional"; "Above Average"; and "Average" or "Below Average". Teachers who described themselves as "Above Average" rated "Nonmonetary Incentives" higher than teachers who described themselves as "Average" or "Below Average". Additionally, teachers who described themselves as "Above Average" rated "Supplemental Pay" higher than teachers who described themselves as "Exceptional".

Gender was the teacher characteristic studied in
Hypothesis 6. Males rated "Merit Pay With Salary
Schedule" and "Merit Pay Without Salary Schedule" higher
than females. And females rated "Nonmonetary Incentives"
and "Career Ladders" higher than males.

The teacher characteristic addressed in Hypothesis 7 was "Grade Level Taught". The four categories of the variable were: elementary; middle school or junior high; high school; and a combination of levels. There were no significant differences between categories for teacher ratings of alternative compensation plans.

Hypothesis 8 examined the interaction between gender and grade level taught for ratings of alternative compensation plans. Female elementary and junior high

teachers and females who taught a combination of levels rated "Nonmonetary Incentives" higher than males who taught at those grade levels. However, male senior high teachers rated "Nonmonetary Incentives" higher than female senior high teachers.

Additionally, female elementary and senior high teachers and those who taught a combination of levels rated "Career Ladders" higher than males who taught at those levels. However, male junior high teachers rated "Career Ladders" higher than female junior high teachers.

Discussion

The results of the tests involving teacher characteristics indicate that some characteristics are significant factors in teachers' ratings of alternative compensation plans. "Number of Professional Courses or Workshops Taken Per Year", "Attitude Toward Change in the Work Setting", and "Self-perception as a Teacher" were statistically significant factors; however, "Years Teaching Experience" and "Employment Outside the District" were not significant factors.

"Years Teaching Experience" was not found to be a significant factor in this study; however, other researchers have concluded that teachers' attitudes

towards a variety of issues change during different stages of their careers (Fuller & Brown, 1975; Newman, 1979; Peterson, 1979). One may speculate that because the whole notion of alternative compensation plans was relatively new to most teachers in the study, even experienced teachers had not had time to formulate, test, and reformulate their opinions of the concept. Perhaps because both novice and experienced teachers were considering this issue for the first time, their ratings were closer than they might have been on a number of other issues.

The findings of the test involving "Professional Courses or Workshops Taken Per Year" substantiate the work of Burden (1985) which indicates that teachers' attitudes change as a result of involvement in professional growth programs. Teachers who participated in two or more professional courses per year rated merit pay significantly higher than teachers who were less involved in professional growth activities. Perhaps teachers taking professional courses acquired information about merit pay plans which influenced them favorably towards it. Or perhaps the teachers who participate in professional growth activities are more open to merit pay because they are less threatened by evaluation, more

committed to the profession, more self-confident, or simply superior educators than teachers who do not participate in many professional growth activities.

The results of the test involving "Employment Outside the School District" do not appear to be consistent with Wisniewski and Kleine's (1983) finding that teachers who have trouble providing necessities for their families will do almost anything to supplement their incomes. Perhaps the participants in this study viewed performance-based pay as less desirable than holding second jobs.

The test involving "Attitude Toward Change in the Work Setting" substantiates previous research indicating that teachers with a high receptivity to change are willing to consider new ideas and take greater risks than teachers with a low receptivity to change (Wangen, 1982; Runkel, 1980).

The findings of the test involving "Self-perception as a Teacher" may indicate that teachers with above average self-concepts are reinforced more by intrinsic motivators ("Nonmonetary Incentives") than are teachers with average or below average self-concepts. Or perhaps teachers with lower self-perceptions are simply not accustomed to receiving nonmonetary rewards in their

jobs and, therefore, have little appreciation for their importance.

A second finding of the test may indicate that teachers with very high self-concepts do not view "Supplemental Pay" as an important aspect of their careers (perhaps most of their time and effort goes into classroom/lesson preparation) while teachers with above average self-concepts perceive extra duty pay as a viable option in their careers.

The results of the test involving gender were consistent with Miller's (1980) conclusion that job rewards for women come from the "challenge and interest inherent in the tasks themselves..." ("Nonmonetary Incentives"). Additionally, the findings involving gender indicate that women may be more open to a total restructuring of the system ("Career Ladders") than men and/or that women view "Career Ladders" as a means of opening doors to advancement within an administratively male-dominated system. Furthermore, the results of this test may suggest that men are more open to competitive plans ("Merit Pay Without Salary Schedule") than are women.

Because there were no significant differences between the ratings of teachers at different grade levels, one

may assume that teachers at all levels share similar perceptions about the different types of plans and that the impact of the plans is seen as affecting teachers at all grade levels in similar ways. This is consistent with Lee's (1987) findings.

The results of the first interaction effect could suggest that female elementary and junior high teachers and male senior high and combination-level teachers are more competitive, more self-confident and/or have more confidence in their administrators' abilities to successfully implement merit pay plans than do male elementary and junior high teachers and female senior high and combination-level teachers.

The results of the second interaction effect could suggest that male elementary and senior high and female junior high and combination teachers are more motivated by professional growth opportunities and recognition than are female elementary and senior high and male junior high and combination-level teachers.

Conclusions Related to Pretest and Posttest Ratings of Alternative Compensation Plans

The fifth objective of the study was to determine whether teachers change their ratings of alternative compensation plans after the development of district

alternative compensation plans. Hypotheses 9 and 10 were included in this objective.

Hypothesis 9 examined the pretest and posttest ratings of teachers who participated in the development of their districts' alternative compensation plans (the experimental group). These teachers rated "Merit pay With Salary Schedule" and "Monetary Incentives" higher after the development of their districts' alternative compensation plans than they had before the development of their districts' alternative compensation plans.

Hypothesis 10 examined the pretest and posttest ratings of teachers who did not participate in the development of their districts' alternative compensation plans (the control group). These teachers rated "Nonmonetary Incentives" and "Supplemental Pay" higher after the development of their districts' plans than they had before the development of the plans.

Discussion

The results of Hypothesis 9 provide support for utilizing inservice programs as a means of facilitating changes in teachers' attitudes. The alternative compensation workshops conducted by Dr. James Sweeney of Iowa State University emphasized merit pay and monetary incentive plans. Both of these types of plans showed

significant increases in ratings by teachers who attended the workshops.

The results of Hypothesis 10 suggest that teachers who are not directly involved in developing a district alternative compensation plan are affected by the process. Although these teachers did not change their attitudes towards "Merit Pay" or "Monetary Incentives" as did the experimental group, they did increase their ratings of two other types of alternative compensation plans, "Nonmonetary Incentives" and "Supplemental Pay". It may be speculated that the process of change in which the districts were engaged along with the second-hand workshop information gained from teachers actively engaged in the process contributed to a generally more positive attitude towards alternative compensation plans. The general improvement in attitude may have been reflected on the posttest surveys by higher ratings of "Supplemental Pay" and "Nonmonetary Incentives" -- the two types of plans which could be regarded as the least threatening or as presenting the least changes to the traditional system.

General Discussion

The results of this study suggest several noteworthy considerations regarding teachers' opinions of

alternative compensation plans. First, teachers want a plan that focuses on professional growth. They reject reward and evaluation components which address other types of issues.

Secondly, teachers prefer the type of alternative compensation plan with which they are most familiar ("Supplemental Pay"). Third, some characteristics of teachers are significant in determining their preference for alternative compensation plans. Those characteristics include their gender, the interaction of gender and grade level taught, the number of professional courses or workshops they take annually, their attitude toward changes in the work setting, and their self-perceptions as teachers.

Fourth, the process of developing an alternative compensation plan appears to affect teachers' opinions of such plans. Attendance at workshops emphasizing "Merit Pay" and "Monetary Incentives" improved teachers' ratings of these two types of plans. Teachers not attending the workshops did not change their ratings of these two types of plans; however, they did increase their ratings of two other types of plans ("Supplemental Pay" and "Nonmonetary Incentives"). One could speculate that this was due to the increased focus on alternative

compensation within the district. Although these teachers were not influenced by the workshops to reconsider the merits of "Monetary Incenctives" and "Merit Pay", the emphasis on developing a new plan may have influenced them to regard the more familiar types of plans more favorably.

Recommendations

This project leads to three recommendations for research in the study of alternative compensation plans.

- 1. This study examined teachers' opinions of alternative compensation plans before and after the development of their districts' plans. A similar study of their opinions after the plans have been in operation for a year or two would provide a valuable addendum to the study.
- 2. Preference for alternative compensation plan was found to be dependent upon gender. Additional studies examining this variable more closely could explain why such differences persist at a time when sexual equality is supposedly being addressed in education today.
- 3. The effect of teacher inservice workshops was studied in this project. Experimental studies of the impact of such training on teacher

attitudes and behavior could provide districts with helpful information regarding strategies for implementing changes within a district.

APPENDIX A:

PRETEST SURVEY

ARROWHEAD AEA 5 PHASE III PROJECT SURVEY

1.	Please write the last 4 digits of your social security number: (This is used only for statistical coding purposes and will not be used to identify you by name.)
2.	Building:
3.	School District:
	Please circle the appropriate answer.
4.	Are you a member of your district's Phase III committee? (1) Yes (2) No
5.	Sex: (1) Male (2) Female
6.	Grade level: (1) Elementary (2) Middle/Junior High (3) High School (4) Combination of 1, 2 and/or 3
7.	Total number of years teaching experience as of June 1, 1987:
8.	In general, to what extent do you participate in professional growth activities outside contract hours? (e.g., college and staff development courses, workshops, etc.)
	(1) 0-1 courses/workshops per year (2) 2-5 courses/workshops per year (3) 6 or more courses/workshops per year
9.	If you are employed outside the school district (summer or during school year), what is the primary purpose for such employment?
	(1) I am not employed outside the district (2) For enjoyment/professional satisfaction (3) To earn money for "extras" (4) To earn money for necessities

- To what extent do you find teaching personally 10. satisfying?
 - (1) Always satisfying (2) Frequently satisfying
 - (3) Occasionally satisfying (4) Seldom satisfying
 - (5) Never satisfying
- 11. In general, how receptive are you to changes in your work setting (e.g., sudden change in teaching assignment, change in principal, etc.)? Which characteristic most accurately represents your feelings?
 - (1) Enthusiastic (2) Interested/open
 - (3) Sometimes positive/sometimes negative
 - (4) Concerned (5) Very concerned
- 12. How do you perceive yourself as a teacher?
 - (1) Exceptional (2) Above average
 - (3) Average (4) Below Average

PERFORMANCE-BASED AND SUPPLEMENTAL PAY COMPONENTS

Following are components of performance-based and supplemental pay plans. If you were developing a plan, how would you rate each component? Use the following scale.

- Detrimental Counterproductive to a workable and
- desirable plan. (1)
 Somewhat Detrimental Generally negative effects. Not recommended for a workable and desirable plan. (2)
 Uncertain - Unsure of effects on plans. (3)
- Somewhat Enhancing Generally positive effects. Recommended for a workable and desirable plan.
- Enhancing Very beneficial to a workable and desirable plan. (5)
- 13. Compensation made on a basis other than a fixed salary schedule.
- ___ 14. Recognition and appreciation expressed by the administration.

15.	Tuition paid for graduate or college courses.
16.	Experienced teachers paid to function as "mentors": help new teachers improve their skills and knowledge.
17.	Participation in a teacher exchange program with other districts or schools (e.g., teacher in district A changes positions with teacher in district B).
18.	Opportunities for expanded roles/new dimensions for teachers (e.g., shared positions, special projects, etc.).
19.	Increased opportunities for professional growth.
20.	Non-monetary recognition for professional growth.
21.	Increased compensation to teachers for continued professional growth.
22.	Additional compensation to educators in a subject area where there is a present shortage of teachers.
23.	Advanced study sabbaticals (at a reasonable funding level).
24.	Incentives for individuals or groups to work on special projects.
25.	Opportunities for sharing a staff position, each with part-time responsibilities.
26.	Staff development opportunities outside the school day.
27.	Released time for staff development activities.
28.	A cash bonus for outstanding performance in a particular area.
29.	Opportunities for participation in planning and decision-making (e.g., programs, curriculum, textbooks, etc.).

 30.	Opportunities to counsel/advise students or groups of students.
 31.	Opportunities to observe other teachers to help them with classroom instruction, management and other concerns.
 32.	Extended contracts for staff to work on school-related matters (e.g., curriculum, textbook selection, staff development, etc.).
	COMPONENTS OF EVALUATION SYSTEM
cvisio	owing are components of various on/evaluation systems. Please rate the effect omponent on an evaluation system.
 33.	Professional growth and the improvement of instruction is stressed.
 34.	Appropriate student growth is considered.
 35.	Professional growth objectives are jointly set by the staff member and the evaluator.
 36.	An evaluation process is used that is different for new teachers than experienced teachers.
 37.	A test of teachers' knowledge of subject matter is included.
 38.	An evaluation process is used that is different for those teachers whose performance is unsatisfactory.
 39.	An evaluation of staff is made only by administrators.
 40.	Peer evaluation is included with administrator evaluation.
 41.	Evaluation by students in included with administrator evaluation.
 42.	Evaluation of staff by trained evaluators outside of the district is included.

PERFORMANCE-BASED AND SUPPLEMENTAL PAY PLANS

Following are 6 examples of performance-based and supplemental pay plans. On the left, please <u>rank</u> them from 1 (the plan which is least desirable) to 6 (the plan which is most desirable).

43. Merit Pay With Salary Schedule: Pay for all teachers is based on teaching effectiveness in the classroom. Salary is determined by a combination of evaluation of teaching performance and the salary schedule. 44. Merit Pay Without Salary Schedule: Pay for all teachers is based on teaching effectiveness in the classroom. Salary is determined annually by evaluation of teaching performance. Pay is based only on performance. 45. Monetary Incentives: Pay is based on the

- 45. Monetary Incentives: Pay is based on the salary schedule, but additional pay may be earned for meeting certain established objectives (e.g., reducing staff absenteeism, accepting difficult teaching assignments, increasing student test scores, etc.). The money may be earned by individual teachers or by an entire staff for meeting school-wide goals.
- 46. Non-monetary Incentives: Pay is based solely on the salary schedule. However, opportunities are available for professional growth, recognition, and expanded roles for teachers who meet certain goals or objectives.
- 47. Career Ladders: Pay may be based on the salary schedule. However, a teacher may elect to enter the career ladder structure. In this case pay is based on the level achieved on the lader (e.g., master teacher, apprentice, etc.). Higher levels are earned through teaching experience, evaluations of performance, professional growth, out-of-class contributions to the district, etc.


48. Supplemental Pay: Pay is based on the salary schedule. However, additional pay may be earned for work outside contract hours (e.g., supervision of students before or after school, work on curriculum committees in the summer, coaching, etc.). Pay is not based on performance.

APPENDIX B:

POSTTEST SURVEY

ARROWHEAD AEA 5 PHASE III PROJECT SURVEY - (POSTTEST)

Δ.	secur:	ity number: (This ed only for statistical coding purposes and will used to identify you by name.)
2.	Buildi	ing:
З.	School	District:
Post	test	numbers 4 through 12 are deleted.
	PERFOR	RMANCE-BASED AND SUPPLEMENTAL PAY COMPONENTS
	lement would	owing are components of performance-based and cal pay plans. If you were developing a plan, you rate each component? Use the following
	Somev Uncer Somev	mental - Counterproductive to a workable and desirable plan. (1) what Detrimental - Generally negative effects. Not recommended for a workable and desirable plan. (2) ttain - Unsure of effects on plan. (3) what Enhancing - Generally positive effects. Recommended for a workable and desirable plan.
	Enhar	(4) ncing - Very beneficial to a workable and desirable plan. (5)
	13.	Compensation made on a basis other than a fixed salary schedule.
	14.	Recognition and appreciation expressed by the administration.
	15.	Tuition paid for graduate or college courses.
	16.	Experienced teachers paid to function as "mentors": help new teachers improve their skills knowledge.




	J	them with classroom instruction, management and other concerns.
	32.	Extended contracts for staff to work on school-related matters (e.g., curriculum, textbook selection, staff development, etc.).
		COMPONENTS OF EVALUATION SYSTEM
	visio	owing are components of various on/evaluation systems. Please rate the effect omponent on an evaluation system.
	33.	Professional growth and the improvement of instruction is stressed.
	34.	Appropriate student growth is considered.
	35.	Professional growth objectives are jointly set by the staff member and the evaluator.
	36.	An evaluation process is used that is different for new teachers than experienced teachers.
	37.	A test of teachers' knowledge of subject matter is included.
	38.	An evaluation process is used that is different for those teachers whose performance is unsatisfactory.
	39.	An evaluation of staff is made only by administrators.
	40.	Peer evaluation is included with administrator evaluation.
	41.	Evaluation by students is included with administrator evaluation.
	42.	Evaluation of staff by trained evaluators outside of the district is included.

PERFORMANCE-BASED AND SUPPLEMENTAL PAY PLANS

RATING

Following are 6 examples of performance-based and supplemental pay plans. Please rate the desirability of each plan.



schedule. However, a teacher may elect to enter the career ladder structure. In this case pay is based on the level achieved on the ladder (e.g., master teacher, apprentice, etc.). Higher levels are earned through teaching experience, evaluations of performance, professional growth, out-of-class contributions to the district, etc.

48. Supplemental Pay: Pay is based on the salary schedule. However, additional pay may be earned for work outside contact hours (e.g., supervision of students before or after school, work on curriculum committees in the summer, coaching, etc.). Pay is not based on performance.

APPENDIX C:

RATINGS OF REWARD COMPONENTS OF ALTERNATIVE COMPENSATION PLANS

Table C.1. Teachers' Ratings of the Reward Component "Compensation Made on a Basis Other Than a Fixed Salary Schedule" (Item 13 on survey).

N = 377

Rating	f	8
(1) Detrimental(2) Somewhat Detrimental(3) Uncertain(4) Somewhat Enhancing(5) Enhancing	47 61 127 102 34	12.5 16.2 33.7 27.1 9.0
Pretest Mean: 3.04	Std. Dev.: 1.15	

Table C.2. Teachers' Ratings of the Reward Component "Recognition and Appreciation Expressed by the Administration" (Item 14 on survey). N = 277

Rating	f	કૃ
(1) Detrimental(2) Somewhat Detrimental(3) Uncertain(4) Somewhat Enhancing(5) Enhancing	24 37 47 117 150	6.4 9.8 12.5 31.1 39.8
Pretest Mean: 3.89	Std. Dev.: 1.22	

Table C.3. Teachers' Ratings of the Rewards Component "Tuition Paid for Graduate or College Courses" (Item 15 on survey). N=377

Rating	f	%
(1) Detrimental(2) Somewhat Detrimenta(3) Uncertain(4) Somewhat Enhancing(5) Enhancing	12 19 30 102 3	3.2 5.0 8.0 27.1
Pretest Mean: 4.2	9 Std. Dev.:	1.03

Table C.4. Teachers' Ratings of the Reward Component "Experienced Teachers Paid to Function as "Mentors" (Item 16 on survey). N = 377

Rating	f	90
(1) Detrimental(2) Somewhat Detrimental(3) Uncertain(4) Somewhat Enhancing(5) Enhancing	8 27 96 173 70	2.1 7.2 25.5 45.9 18.6
Pretest Mean: 3.72	Std. Dev.: .92	

Table C.5. Teachers' Ratings of the Reward Component "Participation in a Teacher Exchange Program with Other Districts or Schools" (Item 17 on survey). N = 377

	Rating	f		ક
(1)	Detrimental	28		7.4
(2)	Somewhat Detrimental	38		10.1
(3)	Uncertain	173		45.9
(4)	Somewhat Enhancing	104		27.7
(5)	Enhancing	33		8.8
	Pretest Mean: 3.20	Std. Dev.:	.92	

Table C.6. Teachers' Ratings of the Reward Component "Opportunities for Expanded Roles/New Dimensions for Teachers (e.g., Shared Positions, Special Projects, etc.)" (Item 18 on survey). N = 377

Rating	f	ą,
(1) Detrimental(2) Somewhat Detrimental(3) Uncertain(4) Somewhat Enhancing(5) Enhancing	6 9 97 20 60	1.6 2.4 25.7 54.1 15.9
Pretest Mean: 3.81	Std. Dev.: .99	

Table C.7. Teachers' Ratings of the Reward Component "Increased Opportunities for Professional Growth" (Item 19 on survey). N = 377

Rating	f	્ર
 (1) Detrimental (2) Somewhat Detrimental (3) Uncertain (4) Somewhat Enhancing (5) Enhancing 	2 4 14 183 172	.5 1.1 3.7 48.5 45.6
Pretest Mean: 4.39	Std. Dev.: .66	

Table C.8. Teachers' Ratings of the Reward Component "Nonmonetary Recognition for Professional Growth" (Item 20 on survey). N=377

Rating	f	%
 (1) Detrimental (2) Somewhat Detrimenta (3) Uncertain (4) Somewhat Enhancing (5) Enhancing 	25 al 41 103 146 59	6.6 10.9 27.3 38.7 15.6
Pretest Mean: 3.	Std. Dev.:	1.09

Table C.9. Teachers' Ratings of the Reward Component "Increased Compensation to Teachers for continued Professional Growth" (Item 21 on survey). N = 377

Rating	f	%
(1) Detrimental(2) Somewhat Detrimental(3) Uncertain(4) Somewhat Enhancing(5) Enhancing	3 3 24 153 192	.8 6.4 40.6 51.2
Pretest Mean: 4.40	Std. Dev.: .72	

Table C.10. Teachers' Ratings of the Reward Component "Additional Compensation to Teachers in a Subject Area Where There Is a Present Shortage of Teachers" (Item 22 on survey).

N = 377

	Rating	f	ફ
(1)	Detrimental	49 87	13.0 23.1
(3)	Somewhat Detrimental Uncertain	110	29.2
(4)	Somewhat Enhancing	80	21.2
(5)	Enhancing	49	13.0
	Pretest Mean: 3.00	Std. Dev.: 1.22	

Table C.11. Teachers' Ratings of the Reward Component "Advanced Study Sabbaticals (At a Reasonable Funding Level)" (Item 23 on survey). N = 377

Rating	f	ş
(1) Detrimental(2) Somewhat Detrimental(3) Uncertain(4) Somewhat Enhancing(5) Enhancing	8 18 110 175 65	2.1 4.8 29.2 46.4 17.2
Pretest Mean: 3.72	Std. Dev.: .88	

Table C.12. Teachers' Ratings of the Reward Component "Incentives for Individuals or Groups to Work on Special Projects" (Item 24 on survey). N = 377

Rating	f	ક
(1) Detrimental(2) Somewhat Detrimental(3) Uncertain(4) Somewhat Enhancing(5) Enhancing	3 7 36 209 121	.8 1.9 9.5 55.4 32.1
Pretest Mean: 4.17	Std. Dev.: .73	

Table C.13. Teachers' Ratings of the Reward Component "Opportunities for Sharing a Staff Position" (Item 25 on survey). N=377

Rating	f	ફ
(1) Detrimental(2) Somewhat Detrimental(3) Uncertain(4) Somewhat Enhancing(5) Enhancing	8 36 156 127 47	2.1 9.5 41.4 33.7 12.5
Pretest Mean: 3.45	Std. Dev.: .91	

Table C.14. Teachers' Ratings of the Reward Component "Staff Development Opportunities Outside the School Day" (Item 26 on survey). N = 377

Rating	f	ò
(1) Detrimental (2) Somewhat Detrimental	11 46	2.9 12.2
(3) Uncertain	86	22.8
(4) Somewhat Enhancing(5) Enhancing	184 46	48.8 12.2
Pretest Mean: 3.56	Sd. Dev.: .96	•

Table C.15. Teachers' Ratings of the Reward Component "Released Time for Staff Development Activities" (Item 27 on survey). N = 377

R	ating		f		용
(2) Some (3) Unce	imental what Detrime rtain what Enhanci ncing		1 8 29 194 141		.3 2.1 7.7 51.5 37.4
Pre	test Mean:	4.24	Std. Dev.:	.71	

Table C.16. Teachers' Ratings of the Reward Component "A Cash Bonus for Outstanding Performance in a Particular Area" (Item 28 on survey). N = 377

Rating	f	용
(1) Detrimental	49	13.0
(2) Somewhat Detrimental	54	14.3
(3) Uncertain	105	27.9
(4) Somewhat Enhancing	93	24.7
(5) Enhancing	72	19.9
Pretest Mean: 3.23	Std. Dev.: 1.28	

Table C.17. Teachers' Ratings of the Reward Component "Opportunities for Participation in Planning and Decision-making" (Item 29 on survey). N = 377

Rat	ing	f		
(3) Uncert	at Detrimental ain at Enhancing	2 3 23 220 127		.5 .8 6.1 58.4 33.7
Prete	st Mean: 4.24	Std. Dev.:	.65	

Table C.18. Teachers' Ratings of the Rewards Component "Opportunities to Counsel/Advise Students or Groups of Students" (Item 30 on survey). N = 377

Rating	f	ક
(1) Detrimental(2) Somewhat Detrimental(3) Uncertain(4) Somewhat Enhancing(5) Enhancing	4 7 140 166 57	1.1 1.9 37.1 44.0 15.1
Pretest Mean: 3.70	Std. Dev.: .78	

Table C.19. Teachers' Ratings of the Reward Component "Opportunities to Observe Other Teachers to help Them With Classroom Instruction, Management and Other Concerns" (Item 31 on survey). N = 377

Rating	f	용
(1) Detrimental(2) Somewhat Detrimental(3) Uncertain(4) Somewhat Enhancing(5) Enhancing	17 32 137 142 45	4.5 8.5 36.3 37.7 11.9
Pretest Mean: 3.45	Std. Dev.: .98	

Table C.20. Teachers' Ratings of the Reward Component "Extended Contracts for Staff to Work on School-related Matters" (Item 32 on survey).

N = 377

Rating	£	96
 (1) Detrimental (2) Somewhat Detrimental (3) Uncertain (4) Somewhat Enhancing (5) Enhancing 	3 6 22 155 190	.8 1.6 5.8 41.1 50.4
Pretest Mean: 4.39	Std. Dev.: .74	

APPENDIX D:

PRETEST RATINGS OF EVALUATION COMPONENTS OF ALTERNATIVE COMPENSATION PLANS

Table D.1. Teachers' Ratings of the Evaluation Component "Professional Growth and the Improvement of Instruction is Stressed" (Item 33 on survey). N=377

	Rating	f	8
(3) (4)	Detrimental Somewhat Detrimental Uncertain Somewhat Enhancing Enhancing	1 9 31 215 119	.3 2.4 8.2 57.0 31.6
	Pretest Mean: 4.18	Std. Dev.: .70	

Table D.2. Teachers' Ratings of the Evaluation Component "Appropriate Student Growth is Considered" (Item 34 on the survey). N 377

	Rating	f	96
(3) (4)	Detrimental Somewhat Detrimental Uncertain Somewhat Enhancing Enhancing	12 36 103 164 60	3.2 9.5 27.3 43.5 15.9
	Pretest Mean: 3.55	Std. Dev.: .97	

Table D.3. Teachers' Ratings of the Evaluation Component "Professional Growth Objectives Are Jointly Set by the Staff Members and the Evaluator" (Item 35 on survey). N = 377

(1)	Rating Detrimental Somewhat Detrimental	f 3 11	* .8 2.9
(3) (4)	Uncertain Somewhat Enhancing Enhancing	60 186 115	15.9 49.3 30.5
	Pretest Mean: 4.06	Std. Dev.: .81	

Table D.4. Teachers' Ratings of the Evaluation Component "An Evaluation Process Is Used that Is Different for New Teachers than Experienced Teachers" (Item 36 on survey). N = 377

Rating	f	 क
(1) Detrimental(2) Somewhat Detrimental(3) Uncertain(4) Somewhat Enhancing(5) Enhancing	21 59 145 104 46	5.6 15.6 38.5 27.6 12.2
Pretest Mean: 3.25	Std. Dev.: 1.04	

Table D.5. Teachers' Ratings of the Evaluation Component
"A Test of Teachers' Knowledge of Subject
Matter is Included" (Item 37 on survey). N
=377

	Rating	f	9
(4)	Detrimental Somewhat Detrimental Uncertain Somewhat Enhancing Enhancing	70 65 153 66 21	18.6 17.2 40.8 17.5 5.5
	Pretest Mean: 2.74	Std. Dev.: 1.12	

Table D.6. Teachers' Ratings of the Evaluation Component "An Evaluation Process Is Used That Is Different for Those Teachers whose Performance Is Unsatisfactory" (Item 38 on survey). N = 377

Rating	£	96
(1) Detrimental	68	18.0
(2) Somewhat Detrimental	93	25.0
(3) Uncertain	152	40.9
(4) Somewhat Enhancing	42	11.1
(5) Enhancing	17	4.6

Pretest Mean: 2.59 Std. Dev.: 1.05

Table D.7. Teachers' Ratings of the Evaluation Component "An Evaluation of Staff Is Made Only by Administrators" (Item 39 on survey). N=377

	Rating	f	
(2) Som (3) Unc (4) Som	rimental mewhat Detrimental mertain mewhat Enhancing mancing	61 105 100 88 20	16.2 27.9 26.5 23.3 5.3
Pre	test Mean: 2.74	Std. Dev.: 1.15	

Table D.8. Teachers' Ratings of the Evaluation Component "Peer Evaluation Is Included with Administrator Evaluation" (Item 40 on survey). N = 377

Rating	f	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
(1) Detrimental(2) Somewhat Detrimental(3) Uncertain(4) Somewhat Enhancing(5) Enhancing	56 57 114 132 15	14.9 15.2 30.2 35.0 4.0
Pretest Mean: 2.98	Std. Dev.:	1.13

Table D.9. Teachers' Ratings of the Evaluation Component "Evaluation by Students Is Included with Administrator Evaluation" (Item 41 on survey). N = 377

	Rating	£	8
(3) (4)	Detrimental Somewhat Detrimental Uncertain Somewhat Enhancing Enhancing	65 88 130 80 9	17.2 23.3 24.5 21.8 2.4
	Pretest Mean: 2.68	Std. Dev.: 1.07	

Table D.10. Teachers' Ratings of the Evaluation Component "Evaluation of Staff by Trained Evaluators Outside of the District Is Included" (Item 42 on survey). N = 377

Rating	f	용
(1) Detrimental(2) Somewhat Detrimental(3) Uncertain(4) Somewhat Enhancing(5) Enhancing	33 48 128 119 46	8.8 12.7 34.0 31.6 12.2
Pretest Mean: 3.26	Std. Dev.: 1.11	

APPENDIX E:

PRETEST RATINGS OF ALTERNATIVE COMPENSATION PLANS

Table E.1. Teachers Ratings of the Alternative Compensation Plan "Merit Pay With Salary Schedule" (Item 43 on the survey). N = 377

Ratings	f	Ş
(1) Highly Undesirable (2) Undesirable	70 80	18.6 21.2
(3) Uncertain (4) Desirable	68 84	18.0 22.3
(5) Highly Desirable	31	8.2

Table E.2. Teachers' Ratings of the Alternative Compensation Plan "Merit Pay Without Salary Schedule". (Item 44 on the survey). N = 377

Rating	f	ક
(1) Highly Undesirable(2) Undesirable(3) Uncertain(4) Desirable(5) Highly Desirable	172 76 58 23 1	45.6 20.2 15.4 6.1 .3

Table E.3. Teacher ratings of the Alternative Compensation Plan "Monetary Incentives", (Item 45 on the survey. N = 377

Rating	f	9
(1) Highly Undesirable	13	3.4
(2) Undesirable	15	4.0
(3) Uncertain	69	18.3
(4) Desirable	163	43.2
(5) Highly Desirable	71	18.8

Table E.4. Teacher Ratings of the Alternative Compensation Plan "Nonmonetary Incentives" (Item 46 on the survey). N=377

Rating	f	ક્ર
(1) Highly Undesirable(2) Undesirable(3) Uncertain(4) Desirable(5) Highly Desirable	18 55 80 150 28	4.8 14.6 21.2 39.8 7.4

Table E.5. Teacher Ratings of the Alternative Compensation Plan "Career Ladders" (Item 47 on the survey). N = 377

Rating	f	8
(1) Highly Undesirable(2) Undesirable(3) Uncertain(4) Desirable(5) Highly Desirable	11 25 103 147 46	2.9 6.6 27.3 39.0 12.2

Table E.6. Teacher Ratings of the Alternative Compensation Plan "Supplemental Pay" (Item 48 on the survey). N=377

Rating	£	ક
(1) Highly Undesirable(2) Undesirable(3) Uncertain(4) Desirable(5) Highly Desirable	12 23 59 143 95	3.2 6.1 15.6 37.9 25.2

APPENDIX F:

PRETEST RESULTS OF ONE-WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE

Table F.1. Pretest results of analysis of variance tests of ratings of alternative compensation plans by years teaching experience

Type of Plan	df	Sum of squares	Mean square	F Ratio	F Prob.
Merit Pay With Salary Schedule Between Groups Within Groups Total	3 322 325	1.05 537.76 538.81	.35 1.67	.21	.890
Merit Pay Without Salary Schedule Between Groups Within Groups Total	3 319 322	1.08 309.41 310.51	.36 .97	.38	.767
Monetary Incentive Between Groups Within Groups Total	3 320 323	2.81 291.33 294.14	.94 .91	1.03	.381
Nonmonetary Incentives Between Groups Within Groups Total	3 320 323	1.77 340.88 342.65	.59 1.07 .88	.55	.646
Career Ladders Between Groups Within Groups Total	3 321 324	3.57 282.12 285.70	1.91	1.35	.257
Supplemental Pay Between Groups Within Groups Total	3 321 324	2.02 338.29 340.31	.67 1.05	.64	.590

Table F.2. Pretest results of analysis of variance tests of ratings of alternative compensation plans by professional courses or workshops taken per year

				i.	
Type of Plan	df	Sum of squares	Mean square	F Ratio	F Prob.
Merit Pay With Salary Schedule Between Groups Within Groups Total	1 329 330	4.19 545.27 549.46	4.19 1.66	2.53	.113
Merit Pay Without Salary Schedule Between Groups Within Groups Total	1 326 327	7.29 306.02 313.31	7.29 .94	7.77	.006**
Monetary Incentive Between Groups Within Groups Total	327 328	.07 301.88 301.95	.06 .92	.07	.791
Nonmonetary Incentives Between Groups Within Groups Total	3 327 328	.21 345.98 346.19	.21 1.06	.19	.658
Career Ladders Between Groups Within Groups Total	3 328 329	.33 287.97 288.29	.33	.37	.543
Supplemental Pay Between Groups Within Groups Total	1 328 329	4.12 341.47 345.59	4.12 1.04	3.95	.048*

^{*}Significant at the .05 level. **Significant at the .01 level.

Table F.3. Pretest results of analysis of variance tests of ratings of alternative compensation plans by employment outside school district

Type of Plan	df	Sum of squares	Mean square	F Ratio	F Prob.
Merit Pay With Salary Schedule Between Groups Within Groups Total	2 318 320	7.76 528.41 536.17	3.88 1.66	2.30	.099
Merit Pay Without Salary Schedule Between Groups Within Groups Total	2 315 317	2.62 306.68 309.30	1.31 .97	1.34	.262
Monetary Incentives Between Groups Within Groups Total	316 318	3.11 292.39 295.50	1.55 .93	1.68	.188
Nonmonetary Incentives Between Groups Within Groups Total	2 316 318	2.18 330.93 333.11	1.09	1.04	.354
Career Ladders Between Groups Within Groups Total	2 317 319	.41 277.79 278.20	.21 .88	.24	.790
Supplemental Pay Between Groups Within Groups Total	2 317 319	.36 339.03 339.39	.18 1.07	.17	.846

Table 4. Pretest results of analysis of variance tests of ratings of alternative compensation plans by attitude toward change

Type of Plan	df	Sum of squares	Mean square	F Ratio	F Prob.
Merit Pay With Salary Schedule Between Groups Within Groups Total	1 331 332	3.54 548.02 551.56	3.54 1.66	2.14	.145
Merit Pay Without Salary Schedule Between Groups Within Groups Total	1 328 329	5.77 312.43 318.20	5.77 .95	6.06	.014*
Monetary Incentives Between Groups Within Groups Total	328 329	1.19 302.25 303.44	1.19 .92	1.30	.255
Nonmonetary Incentives Between Groups Within Groups Total	1 329 330	.66 348.38 349.05	.66 1.06	. 63	.429
Career Ladders Between Groups Within Groups Total	1 330 331	.84 288.12 288.05	.84 .87	.96	.327
Supplemental Pay Between Groups Within Groups Total	1 330 331	.42 347.21 347.63	.42 1.05	.40	.530
			•		

^{*}Significant at the .05 level.

Table 5. Pretest results of analysis of variance tests of ratings of alternative compensation plans by self-perception as a teacher

Type of Plan	df	Sum of squares	Mean square	F Ratio	F Prob.
Merit Pay With Salary Schedule Between Groups Within Groups Total	2 328 330	4.07 546.83 550.90	2.04 1.67	1.22	.296
Merit Pay Without Salary Schedule Between Groups Within Groups Total	2 326 328	2.58 314.97 317.55	1.29 .97	1.34	.264
Monetary Incentive Between Groups Within Groups Total	2 326 328	.69 302.67 303.36	.35 .93	.37	.690
Nonmonetary Incentives Between Groups Within Groups Total	2 326 328	12.33 336.17 348.50	6.17 1.03	5.98	.003**
Career Ladders Between Groups Within Groups Total	2 327 329	.65 287.80 288.45	.33 .88	.37	.691
Supplemental Pay Between Groups Within Groups Total	2 327 329	7.88 339.70 347.59	3.94 1.04	3.80	.024*

^{*}Significant at the .05 level. **Significant at the .01 level.

APPENDIX G:

PRETEST RESULTS OF TWO-WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE

Pretest survey results of analysis of variance test of ratings of alternative compensation plans by gender by grade level taught Table G.1.

					
Type of Plan	df	Sum of squares	Mean Square	F- Value	F Prob.
Merit Pay With Salary Schedule Gender Grade Level Taught Interaction	1 3 3	8.07 1.61 6.63	8.07 .58 2.21	5.00 .33 1.37	*.026 .802 .258
Merit Pay Without Salary Schedule Gender Grade Level Taught Interaction	1 3 3	6.70 4.01 1.00	6.70 1.34 .03	7.02 1.40 .03	**.008 .242 .990
Monetary Incentives Gender Grade Level Taught Interaction	1 3 3	2.81 1.34 6.47	2.81 .45 2.16	3.04 .48 2.34	.082 .700 .074
Non-monetary Incentives Gender Grade Level Taught Interaction	1 3 3	5.42 4.15 10.25	5.42 1.38 3.42	5.59 1.43 3.53	*.019 .235 *.015
Career Ladders Gender Grade Level Taught Interaction	1 3 3	4.19 3.25 7.96	4.19 1.09 2.65	4.88 1.26 3.09	*.028 .287 .027
Supplemental Pay Gender Grade Level Taught Interaction	1 3 3	.06 .89 1.74	.06 .30 .58	.06 .28 .55	.808 .839 .647

^{*}Significant at the .05 level. **Significant at the .01 level.

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